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LEGAL CLAIMS AND
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW
HIROSHI MOTOMURA†
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the rights of unauthorized migrants and
elucidates how these noncitizens are incompletely but importantly
integrated into the U.S. legal system. I examine four topics: (1) state
and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants, (2) workplace rights
and remedies, (3) suppression of evidence from an unlawful search or
seizure, and (4) the right to effective counsel in immigration court.
These four inquiries show how unauthorized migrants—though
unable to assert individual rights as directly as U.S. citizens in the
same circumstances—can nevertheless assert rights indirectly and
obliquely by making transsubstantive arguments that fall into five
general patterns. The first is an institutional competence argument that
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the wrong decisionmaker acted. The second is an argument that an
unauthorized migrant was wronged by a comparatively culpable
person. The third is a citizen proxy argument that sustaining an
unauthorized migrant’s claim will protect a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident. The fourth is that an unauthorized migrant may
be unable to challenge the substance of a decision, yet may mount a
successful procedural surrogate challenge to the way that decision was
reached. The fifth is a phantom norm argument that, even if a
government action withstands constitutional challenge, it violates a
statute or regulation.
These patterns illustrate how typical doctrinal relationships and
litigation strategies—for example, choosing between equal protection
and preemption arguments, or between seeking redress for harms to
individuals and harms to groups—shift significantly for unauthorized
migrants. These patterns of oblique rights reflect a pervasive national
ambivalence about immigration outside the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Does an unauthorized migrant have rights? What are they? The
answers to these questions have great practical meaning in the lives of
over eleven million men, women, and children who live in the United
1
States in violation of federal immigration laws. The answers also say
much about how these noncitizens, though their presence in the
United States is outside the law, are part of U.S. society in important
and telling ways, particularly as actors in a legal system of rights and
responsibilities.
This Article begins, however, by acknowledging that these
questions may seem odd. A reader trained in the law might even
think that only an unschooled commentator would pose them, for
surely the answers begin with the phrase, “it depends.” A few years
back, a television network asked me to videotape a brief segment. A
voiceover and graphic would pose a question from a viewer: Do
immigrants have rights? For exactly sixty seconds, I was on camera to
give an answer that would fit neatly between shows. There would be
no editing, so needless to say the shoot required multiple takes. All
the while, I thought to myself: Who are the immigrants that viewers
have in mind? What kind of rights are they envisioning?
So I admit that skepticism about my opening questions is
reasonable. But I also believe that this inquiry, though nearly
boundless, is worthwhile. It is axiomatic that unauthorized migrants—
or “undocumented immigrants” or “illegal aliens,” as opposing sides
2
of the debate would call them—are here outside the law. But by
1. See MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009,
at 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2009.
pdf (estimating the unauthorized immigrant population living in the United States at 11.6
million in January 2008); JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A
PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES app. B at 29 tbl.B1
(2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf (showing a total unauthorized
immigrant population of 11.9 million in 2008 and providing figures for individual states).
2. I use this phrase deliberately as an attempt to be more literally accurate and more
neutral than “illegal” or “undocumented” immigration. I do not use the phrase to suggest that
unlawfully present individuals are in a domain in which law is nonexistent or irrelevant. It is a
construct of the law itself that places them outside the law. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2047–55 (2008) (discussing the meaning of
“unlawful presence”); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN,
HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 1291 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing usage of the terms “illegal aliens,” “undocumented
aliens,” and “unauthorized migrants”); Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration
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living and working in the United States, unauthorized migrants are
part of American society in significant ways, and it turns out that they
enjoy substantial integration into the overall U.S. legal system. At the
same time, this integration is incomplete. This Article analyzes how
and why this is so.
The core argument of this Article is that the rights of
unauthorized migrants have evolved in certain patterns that reflect
various aspects of a pervasive national ambivalence about
3
immigration outside the law. Because the presence of these
noncitizens in the United States is literally outside the law, it would
be dissonant—and arguably inconsistent with some ideas that
underlie the rule of law—to allow unauthorized migrants to assert
legal claims as if their presence were lawful. Yet these migrants live as
part of U.S. society in ways that are not just economically and socially
important, but also deeply rooted in American history, especially in
the complex relationship between the United States and Latin
America. To allow their status as unlawful residents to relegate these
migrants to legal oblivion would offend other, more fundamental
4
ideas that underlie the rule of law. And so an uneasy ambivalence
about immigration outside the law produces ways for unauthorized
Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 18 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 3, 13
(1997) (discussing how the term “alien” is used to depersonalize unauthorized migrants); Gerald
L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal
Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1440–42 (1995) (analyzing the meaning of the term
“illegal alien”).
3. Soon after the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), Professor Linda Bosniak
wrote: “Undocumented immigrants live at the boundary of the national membership
community. They have long occupied a unique, deeply ambivalent place in the United States.”
Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker
Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 956. The ambivalence analyzed in Professor
Bosniak’s foundational piece has evolved into intertwined patterns of oblique rights that I
examine in this Article.
4. See Shortfalls of the 1996 Immigration Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and International Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 42 (2007) (statement of Hiroshi Motomura, Kenan
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (explaining how
“rule of law” includes not only enforcement, but also discretion subject to legal standards,
decisionmaking that is based on expertise but subject to checks and balances, and due process);
Motomura, supra note 2, at 2085–92 (explaining that “rule of law” is a malleable concept that
can include not just enforcement of the letter of the law, but also recognition of claims to
equality or membership based on historical relationships and obligations); Hiroshi Motomura,
The Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 139, 144–51 (2008)
(explaining that “immigration law is not self-executing but requires due process and the exercise
of discretion”).
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migrants to assert—and for courts and agency decisionmakers to
sustain—their rights indirectly and obliquely, even when
unauthorized migrants cannot make claims on the same footing as
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.
To pursue this analysis, this Article examines four topics:
(1) state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants, (2)
workplace rights and remedies, (3) the suppression of evidence from
an unlawful search or seizure, and (4) the right to effective counsel in
immigration court. Though these topics range broadly, the selection is
not random. At least the first three have been arenas for sustained,
often vehement debate, not just in the courts, legislatures, and
agencies, but also in the media, communities, streets, and wherever
public debate about immigration outside the law has surfaced. But
beyond these topics’ practical significance, they share two features
that make joint analysis worthwhile. First, the ability of unauthorized
migrants to assert legal claims is deeply contested in these areas of
law, unlike general acceptance of fire protection for unauthorized
migrants, for example. Second, intense political and judicial activity
has turned these areas into laboratories for emerging patterns of
argument and decisionmaking.
Part I discusses the recent efforts of numerous states and cities to
address the arrival of unauthorized migrants by enacting laws
intended to drive them out. Immigrants’ rights advocates have
brought lawsuits challenging these state and local laws, which this
5
Article sometimes refers to as subfederal laws. Part II examines legal
issues that emerge from the essential role of unauthorized workers in
many U.S. industries and occupations. The question has naturally
arisen whether these workers are protected by the laws that address
labor organizing, safety and health, discrimination, wages, and other
aspects of the workplace. Part III analyzes the ability of unauthorized
migrants to invoke Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful
searches and seizures. These issues have arisen from the raids on
worksites, homes, and other venues that have become a significant
part of immigration law enforcement. Part IV looks at the right to
effective counsel in immigration court. Though much less visible in

5. I use the term “subfederal” to include states, counties, cities, school districts, special
districts, and all other government entities below the federal level. When this Article refers to
“states and localities,” “states and cities,” and “state and local,” I intend these phrases to refer
to the same government entities as the term “subfederal.”
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public politics, this issue has been the focus of heated controversy
between the federal government and advocacy groups.
I do not claim that these four inquiries combine to be exhaustive.
But, taken together, they illustrate key facets of the incomplete
integration of unauthorized migrants into the U.S. legal system in
ways that are more revealing than analysis of any one of these areas
alone. Unauthorized migrants can assert their rights in practical
effect—albeit indirectly and incompletely—by adopting at least five
general patterns that cut across these four substantive areas. All five
patterns allow unauthorized migrants to assert oblique versions of
rights that U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents can exercise in
the same settings.
First, unauthorized migrants may successfully challenge a
government decision because the wrong agency or official makes it,
even if they cannot challenge the decision’s substance. For example,
even when it is extremely difficult to attack a state or local law on
equal protection grounds, the possibility of race or ethnic
discrimination may help convince a court that a state or local law is
preempted because state and local governments are institutionally
more susceptible to improper bias. This is what I call an institutional
competence argument.
Second, an unauthorized migrant might successfully assert a right
against a wrongdoer, but only as to conduct that is more culpable
than the unauthorized migrant’s. For example, unauthorized workers
who have been injured on the job may enhance the likely success of
lost future wage claims against their employers by arguing that the
employer’s culpability in allowing the employees to work outweighed
the employee’s own culpability in working without authorization. I
call this a comparative culpability argument.
Third, an unauthorized migrant may successfully assert rights if
recognizing those rights would protect a U.S. citizen or lawfully
present noncitizen who serves as a citizen proxy. For example, courts
adjudicating a noncitizen’s removal from the United States may
suppress evidence from a search that violates the Fourth Amendment
in a way—such as by improperly relying on ethnic appearance—that
may harm U.S. citizens if the same practice were applied to them.
This is what I term a citizen proxy argument.
Fourth, even if a direct challenge to the substance of an
immigration rule fails, a court might invalidate the process of
reaching or applying that decision. For example, a court that balks at
an explicit grant of workplace rights to an unauthorized worker might
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reach the same result by adopting a traditional procedural rule that
puts immigration law status beyond the scope of civil discovery. The
result is to treat unauthorized migrants as if they were lawfully
present. I refer to this as a procedural surrogate argument.
Fifth, a government action may withstand constitutional
challenge, but a court might find that it violates a statute or
regulation. For example, an immigration judge may hesitate to find as
a constitutional matter that evidence should be suppressed under the
limited exclusionary rule that applies in removal proceedings for
Fourth Amendment violations. The same judge may nonetheless
order suppression because the search violated the federal
government’s own regulations. This is a phantom norm argument.
This Article discusses these and further examples of the five
patterns. Together, these patterns—which emerge from and cut
across the four topics discussed in this Article—show how
unauthorized migrants remain at the law’s margins with rights that
are indirect and oblique.
I. STATE AND LOCAL LAWS
For the American republic’s first century, state and local
immigration laws were almost the only source of immigration
6
regulation. There were many reasons for this, some of which might
not immediately appear relevant today. Of these reasons, perhaps the
7
most arresting was slavery. While it existed, the federal government
could not regulate migration without addressing intractable questions
about the movement of slaves and free blacks. Only after the Civil
War did today’s prevailing view of immigration federalism—that
federal immigration regulation displaces any state laws on the
8
admission and expulsion of noncitizens—begin to emerge.

6. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1835–84 (1993) (exploring pre-1875 state and local immigration laws);
see also ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 74–76 (2006) (discussing state regulatory efforts).
7. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 24–25 (2006) (discussing factors that
influenced the shift to federal immigration laws).
8. See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 270–75 (1876) (holding unconstitutional
New York and Louisiana statutes that regulated the admission of immigrants through the port
of New York, on the ground that they infringed upon the federal power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–81 (1876) (“The passage of laws
which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
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Constrained by federal preemption of any state and local laws
that directly regulate immigration, states and localities have
addressed immigration outside the law in two other ways. One is state
and local involvement in federal immigration enforcement—for
example, agreements authorizing states and localities to carry out
9
some federal enforcement functions. The other, which is the focus of
this Part, consists of numerous state and local laws limiting access to
education, employment, housing, health care, or welfare, or otherwise
10
making life harder for the unauthorized to persuade or force them to
11
leave.
These state and local laws merit analysis because they illustrate
the key role that institutional competence arguments can play in
allowing unauthorized migrants to assert rights obliquely and
incompletely. This Part focuses principally on the connections
between (a) individual rights arguments grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) institutional
competence arguments grounded in federal preemption. Section A
explains how equal protection arguments against unfavorable
12
treatment of unauthorized migrants are extremely difficult to make.
And yet, as Section B discusses, the same evidence that weakly
supports an equal protection challenge may be crucial to the success
of a preemption challenge. In this way, as Section C addresses, a
preemption-based institutional competence argument allows
unauthorized migrants to assert their individual rights obliquely,
though sometimes with unintended consequences.

Congress, and not to the States.”). See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 7, at 21–25 (discussing
the shift from state to federal immigration regulation).
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006)
(authorizing agreements that allow state and local officers to investigate, apprehend, and detain
aliens to enforce federal immigration laws).
10. See CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI & KIMBERLY NORTMAN, TESTING
THE LIMITS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE LEGALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL
IMMIGRATION MEASURES 8–9, 23–24, 32–43, 47–51 (2007) (summarizing recent state and local
measures).
11. See Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 160 (2008) (“If a strategy of attrition through
enforcement were implemented nationwide, it would gradually, but inexorably, reduce the
number of illegal aliens in the United States.”); Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal
Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through Enforcement, BACKGROUNDER (Center for
Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), May 2005, at 1, 1–6, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/
2005/back605.pdf (arguing that consistent enforcement of immigration laws would steadily
reduce the population of unauthorized migrants).
12. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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A. Individual Rights: Equal Protection
A 1975 Texas statute allowing local school districts to deny
enrollment to any child not “legally admitted” to the United States
ushered in the modern era for state and local laws addressing
13
unauthorized migration. The ensuing litigation led to the 1982 U.S.
14
Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, which upheld, as a matter
of constitutional law, the access of schoolchildren living in Texas to
public elementary and secondary schools regardless of the child’s
15
immigration law status.
Plyler is foundational for understanding immigration outside the
law. The decision is especially valuable for understanding the
connections between individual rights and institutional competence
arguments because the plaintiff schoolchildren challenged the Texas
16
statute on both equal protection and preemption grounds. Early in
its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear its view that it did
17
not need to address the preemption challenge. Turning almost
immediately to the equal protection issue, the Court started with the
proposition that the Constitution—in particular, the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment—applies to
all persons in the United States, regardless of lawful or unlawful
18
19
presence. The dissent agreed with this proposition.
But what matters is not whether but how the Constitution applies
to unauthorized migrants. As a decision on constitutional claims by
unauthorized migrants, Plyler’s holding has been confined to the
20
context in which it arose. The Court’s equal protection rationale—
21
especially its application of intermediate judicial scrutiny —relied so
13. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1981), invalidated by Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
14. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
15. Id. at 216–30.
16. See id. at 206–10 (discussing the lower courts’ decisions, including rulings on
preemption).
17. See id. at 210 n.8 (“Appellees . . . continue to press the argument that § 21.031 is preempted by federal law and policy. In light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment
issue, we have no occasion to reach this claim.”).
18. Id. at 210–16.
19. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal
entry into this country, are indeed physically ‘within the jurisdiction’ of a state.”).
20. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2043 (exploring why Plyler has not been extended
beyond the context of public primary and secondary education).
21. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–30.
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22

heavily on the involvement of children and education that no court
has ever used it to overturn a statute disadvantaging unauthorized
23
migrants outside the context of K–12 public education.
That Plyler only weakly supports equal protection challenges to
statutes that disadvantage unauthorized migrants is consistent with
the case law on equal protection challenges by noncitizens who are in
the United States. These decisions have sometimes sustained equal
protection challenges, but only by noncitizens who are lawfully
present. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Graham v.
24
Richardson, which held that Arizona and Pennsylvania ran afoul of
both equal protection and preemption because their state welfare
25
benefits rules barred lawful permanent residents, is a landmark. To
be sure, Graham did not distinguish between lawfully and unlawfully
present noncitizens. The Court observed generally that
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
26
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”
Citing the famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products
27
Co., the next sentence in Graham declared, “Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such
28
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” Here, too, the Court
seemed to address all noncitizens together.
But later cases have established that strict scrutiny does not
apply to all statutes that treat unauthorized migrants and U.S. citizens
differently. The 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mathews v.
29
Diaz concerned lawfully present noncitizens but is relevant to
unauthorized migrants because the Court defined constitutional limits
on federal laws that affect noncitizens. Diaz upheld federal rules that
denied Medicare eligibility to some lawfully present noncitizens,
including some who had been permanent residents for less than five

22. See id. at 218–30 (discussing the importance of education, and the great societal and
individual harms that occur when it is denied to children).
23. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2075–76 (discussing Plyler’s narrow doctrinal scope). In
this regard, Plyler stands in sharp contrast to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
which also arose in the context of K–12 public education but acquired a broader significance as
the starting point for the invalidation of segregation in many other American institutions.
24. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
25. Id. at 371–80.
26. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
27. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
28. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (citation omitted).
29. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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30

years. In contrast to Graham, the Court held in Diaz that strict
scrutiny does not apply to a federal enactment that disadvantages
31
lawful permanent residents.
Though Diaz said that the federal government may disadvantage
permanent residents when states cannot, the Court did not simply
32
apply preemption analysis. Instead, it explained that “equal
protection analysis . . . involves significantly different considerations
because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States
33
rather than between aliens and the Federal Government.” Together,
Graham and Diaz establish that equal protection doctrine limits both
federal and subfederal governments, but the federal government has
greater power than the states to classify by immigration and
34
citizenship status.
Six years after Diaz, the Court reasoned in Plyler that strict
scrutiny does not apply to a law that disadvantages unauthorized

30. Id. at 77–87.
31. See id. at 81–84 (asserting that the need for flexibility in policy choices in the face of
changing world conditions requires “a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the
Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization”); see also id. at 80
(“Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident
diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in
the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its
guests.”).
32. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the
National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 283–93 (exploring possible justifications for the
Court’s restrained review of the statute at issue); cf. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a
Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98–
102 (1985) (exploring the substantive norms inside Justice Blackmun’s equal protection
framework as it applies to aliens); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism
and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 205–06 (1994) (explaining that an equal protection
model can justify certain alienage classifications on a federal level where those same
classifications would be unacceptable on a state level); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1430–40
(arguing for the validity and necessity of an equal protection approach to discrimination against
aliens). But see David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal
Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1085–86, 1088 (1979) (asserting that Diaz is better
understood as a preemption decision than as an equal protection one); cf. Michael J. Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–
65 (1979) (arguing that the Court’s doctrine concerning alienage-based classifications is
justifiable not as a matter of equal protection, but rather of federalism).
33. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84–85.
34. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984) (“As a general matter, a state law that
discriminates on the basis of alienage can be sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial
scrutiny.”).
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migrants because they are not a “suspect class.” Beyond the context
of access to K–12 public education, subfederal laws that disadvantage
36
unauthorized migrants require only a rational basis. So far, history
has shown Plyler to be a high-water mark, and not a decision that
prompted a new era in equal protection for unauthorized migrants
generally.
In contrast to equal protection challenges that characterize laws
disadvantaging unauthorized migrants as based on immigration
status, is there any room to argue that these laws are based on race
and/or ethnicity, and thus violate equal protection for that reason?
37
The plaintiffs made this argument in Lozano v. City of Hazleton,
which challenged ordinances adopted in 2006 and 2007 by the city of
38
Hazleton, Pennsylvania. One ordinance barred the employment and
39
harboring of unauthorized migrants. Another required renters to
have occupancy permits, which city officials would issue only upon
40
proof of lawful residence or U.S. citizenship. The plaintiffs argued,
among other things, that the city violated equal protection by
41
discriminating unlawfully by race, ethnicity, and national origin.
They
presented
evidence
that
the
ordinances
would
disproportionately affect Latinos, but District Judge James Munley,

35. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (“Unlike most of the classifications that
we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the
product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime.”).
36. Cf. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415–19 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that laws affecting
nonimmigrant aliens require only a rational basis). Commentators have criticized this aspect of
prevailing doctrine as providing insufficient protection to unauthorized migrants. See, e.g., Jason
H. Lee, Unlawful Status as a “Constitutional Irrelevancy”?: The Equal Protection Rights of
Illegal Immigrants, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 19–40 (2008) (arguing that a lesser standard
of review for classifications involving illegal immigrants is inconsistent with the principles of
individual dignity and humanity that underlie the Equal Protection Clause); Neuman, supra
note 2, at 1440–52 (arguing that rational basis review would allow the state to deny
unauthorized migrants even the minimum standards that it owes under the Constitution to
every human being). In Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
declined to reach the nonimmigrants’ equal protection claims. Id. at 9–10.
37. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No. 07-3531
(3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
38. Id. at 484–85.
39. Id. at 484.
40. Id. By discussing a local law directed at unauthorized migrants, I do not mean to ignore
the many subfederal laws and policies that attempt to integrate unauthorized migrants, or even
to offer protection from enforcement of federal immigration laws. See generally Motomura,
supra note 2, at 2075–83 (discussing the role of states and localities in the integration of
unauthorized migrants).
41. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 538–42.

MOTOMORA IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

1735

noting the ordinances’ facial neutrality, found insufficient evidence of
42
discriminatory intent, which an equal protection challenge requires.
As long as the touchstone in prevailing constitutional doctrine is
intent rather than effect, race or ethnic discrimination is an
unpromising way to argue that subfederal laws violate equal
protection by targeting unauthorized migrants. And as long as courts
demand only a rational basis for statutes that disadvantage
noncitizens because they are in the United States unlawfully, equal
protection challenges based on immigration status alone will fail.
A telling sign that attorneys for unauthorized migrants recognize
these severe limitations is the plaintiffs’ strategy in Equal Access
43
Education v. Merten. That litigation responded to a 2002 opinion by
the Virginia Attorney General that “illegal or undocumented aliens
should not be enrolled in Virginia public institutions of higher
44
education.” The plaintiffs did not argue that such a state bar to
admission violated equal protection. Rather, their constitutional
45
challenge relied principally on federal preemption.
In Equal Access Education, the plaintiffs gave up on the equal
protection argument that carried the day in Plyler, instead relying
only on the preemption argument Plyler had expressly declined to

42. Id. at 540–42 (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). The
same dilemma exists as to other state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants. It is not
enough to win an unlawful race or ethnic discrimination claim. This is true even if challengers
can show some racial or ethnic animus. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration
Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and
Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 651 (1995) (“[I]t is difficult to refute the claim
that the ethnicity of the stereotypical undocumented immigrant played at least some role in the
passage of Proposition 187.” (footnote omitted)); Neuman, supra note 2, at 1451–52 (discussing
“strong indications that Proposition 187 owed some of its attractiveness to animosity toward
Latino immigration”). Interestingly, though Judge Munley rejected the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim in City of Hazleton, he sustained their argument that the ordinance, by
restricting access to rental housing, violated the rights of unauthorized migrants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, which “provides that ‘all persons’ shall . . . have the same right to make and enforce
contracts and have the full and equal benefit of all laws to the same extent enjoyed by ‘white
citizens.’” City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 546–48.
43. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
44. Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Attorney Gen. of Va., to Presidents,
Chancellor, Rectors, Registrars, Admissions Dirs., Domicile Officers, and Foreign Student
Advisors, and the Executive Dir., State Council for Higher Educ. in Va. (Sept. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.schev.edu/AdminFaculty/ImmigrationMemo9-5-02APL.pdf. For a
discussion of this Memorandum, see Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
45. Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 601–08.
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46

address. This emphasis on preemption has been a sound strategy,
according to the track record for preemption challenges to subfederal
laws targeting unauthorized migrants. With the prominent exception
of Plyler, the courts that have invalidated state and local laws have
47
generally relied on preemption. In doing so, they have applied the
framework from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in
48
De Canas v. Bica to decide if a state or local immigration-related law
49
conflicts with federal law. Given the obstacles to equal protection
claims by unauthorized migrants, preemption has become the
challenge of choice, and thus the focus of judicial opinions.
B. Institutional Competence Arguments: Preemption
What is the significance of the trend away from equal protection
challenges to subfederal laws toward preemption arguments? The
challengers’ reliance on preemption taps into a long tradition of
institutional competence claims in immigration and alienage law.
Government action, even if not susceptible to equal protection or any
other individual rights challenge, may be invalid if the government
actor is not institutionally competent to make the decision. Thus,
preemption can nullify a state or local law, even assuming that a
substantively identical federal law would be valid.
To understand the relationship between preemption as an
institutional competence argument and equal protection as its
individual rights counterpart, it is important first to see that
preemption is not the only type of institutional competence argument
with purchase in immigration and alienage law. Consider the 1976
50
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, which

46. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 n.8 (1982); see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
47. E.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764–72
(N.D. Tex. 2007); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054–57 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
48. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). A state or local law relating to immigration or
immigrants is preempted if it meets any of the three tests set out in De Canas. First, federal law
preempts any state attempt to regulate immigration. Id. at 354. Second, state law is preempted if
Congress intended to “occupy the field” in that it was the “clear and manifest purpose of
Congress” to effect a “complete ouster of state power—including state power to promulgate
laws not in conflict with federal laws.” Id. at 357 & n.5 (citation omitted). Third, a state law is
preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress,” id. at 363 (citations omitted), or conflicts with federal law so as to
make compliance with both state and federal law impossible.
49. See id. at 354–63 (establishing a preemption framework).
50. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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concerned a Civil Service Commission requirement that federal
51
employees be U.S. citizens or nationals. The Court invalidated the
52
rule because the wrong federal agency had adopted it. The Court
reasoned that the Civil Service Commission could not act pursuant to
the federal immigration and naturalization power, and thus lacked
institutional competence to make decisions on immigration or
53
immigrants. But the Court suggested that either Congress or the
president could adopt the same requirement, and lower courts later
upheld an Executive Order from President Gerald Ford that
54
generally barred noncitizens from federal jobs.
55
Similar reasoning is evident in Aliessa v. Novello, a prominent
New York Court of Appeals decision that invalidated a New York
state restriction on state Medicaid benefits for lawfully present
56
noncitizens. The plaintiffs argued that Graham v. Richardson
controlled, with its apparent prohibition on state laws disadvantaging
57
lawfully present noncitizens. The state responded that Mathews v.
Diaz had recognized federal authority to adopt different eligibility
58
rules for citizens and lawfully present noncitizens, and that Congress
had expressly delegated that authority to the states. In Aliessa, the
59
New York Court of Appeals rejected the state’s argument. Citing
Mow Sun Wong, the court held that the federal government cannot
60
authorize the states to adopt their own rules. The outcomes, the
court explained, would vary from state to state, violating the

51. Id. at 90 n.6 (discussing the requirement in the Civil Service Commission regulations,
5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976), that only U.S. citizens or people owing “permanent allegiance” to the
United States may sit for competitive civil service examinations).
52. Id. at 114–17 (“Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by
Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting
under the Attorney General of the United States, due process requires that the decision . . . be
made at either a comparable level of government or . . . be justified by reasons which are
properly the concern of [the Civil Service Commission].”).
53. Id. at 101–03, 105, 114–16.
54. See Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 744–45 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (affirming both the president’s power to issue and
the constitutionality of 5 C.F.R. §§ 7.4 and 338.101).
55. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).
56. Id. at 1098.
57. Id. at 1095 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
58. Id. at 1096 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
59. Id. at 1094–99.
60. Id. at 1097–98.
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constitutional requirement of uniform citizenship rules. This, again,
was an institutional competence argument.
Of course, institutional competence arguments are not unique to
the law governing unauthorized migration, or to immigration and
alienage law. But they make a difference in the outcome of cases
when individual rights claims by noncitizens are difficult to sustain. In
Mow Sun Wong, the obstacle was not unlawful immigration status
because the plaintiffs were lawful permanent residents of the United
62
States. But even for lawful permanent residents, an alienage-based
equal protection challenge to a properly adopted federal requirement
63
of citizenship was impossible to win, according to Diaz. Graham did
64
not help plaintiffs because it addressed only state laws. With bleak
prospects for any individual rights claim, the institutional competence
argument was the Mow Sun Wong plaintiffs’ only winning
constitutional challenge.
An analogous situation prevails in the context of state and local
laws that target unauthorized migrants. Just as the federal
government can treat lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens
differently, state and local governments can disadvantage
unauthorized migrants as long as the case involves neither access to
65
public K–12 education nor proof of racial or ethnic discrimination.
Because it is extremely difficult to succeed with equal protection
66
claims based on immigration law status, race, or ethnicity,
institutional competence claims have special significance for
unauthorized migrants. A preemption-based institutional competence
argument, not an equal protection–based individual rights argument,
is typically the challengers’ only hope of prevailing and the statute’s
only risk of invalidation.

61. Id. But see Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255–57 (10th Cir. 2004) (disagreeing
with Aliessa and upholding a similar Colorado statute).
62. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 90 (1976).
63. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 84.
64. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
65. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (addressing the K–12 education
context), with Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 540–41 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued,
No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenges to city
ordinances restricting the access of undocumented aliens to employment and rental housing,
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the ordinances were motivated by discriminatory
intent).
66. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
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C. The Implications of Institutional Competence Arguments
What are the implications of pursuing institutional competence
claims like preemption instead of individual rights claims like equal
protection? Professor Harold Koh once observed that preemption is
much weaker than equal protection as a vehicle for redressing harms
67
that befall noncitizens. Analyzing why permanent residents could
challenge state laws in Graham but not the federal law in Diaz, he
argued that preemption did not explain the different outcomes.
Professor Koh wrote: “A pure preemption theory, based solely on a
structural norm, lacks substantive content. For that reason, it cannot
68
serve as a theory of individual ‘rights’ at all.”
Professor Koh’s reasoning seems persuasive as applied to lawful
permanent residents, to whom Graham gives robust equal
69
protection–based constitutional status. For unauthorized migrants,
70
however, equal protection offers very little. What matters for them is
how institutional competence arguments may sometimes substitute
for the inability to assert individual rights directly. And when one
examines courts’ decisions on preemption challenges to subfederal
laws that target unauthorized migrants, three patterns emerge that
jointly show how preemption-based institutional competence
arguments obliquely substitute for individual rights arguments based
on equal protection. A judge concerned that racial or ethnic animus is
the impetus for a law that targets unauthorized migrants can channel
those concerns into the preemption analysis. This channeling allows
preemption to operate obliquely as equal protection for unauthorized
migrants.
First, and unsurprisingly, courts have insisted that state and local
laws rely on federal immigration law status rather than draw their
own lines. According to the district court in Equal Access Education,
any Virginia rule barring unauthorized migrants from state colleges
and universities would be preempted if it applies “standards different

67. See Koh, supra note 32, at 99–100 (“I prefer an equal protection approach because it
answers, in a way that preemption reasoning does not, the moral and philosophical claims that
resident aliens make against their state governments.”).
68. Id. at 98; see also Neuman, supra note 2, at 1436–40.
69. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
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from those established under federal law to determine an applicant’s
71
immigration status.”
Even when state and local laws rely on federal immigration law
standards, some federal courts remain skeptical. The apparent
concern is that these state and local laws will affect some
unauthorized migrants whom federal immigration enforcement might
not target. One court expressed concern that state and local laws
72
would undermine federal enforcement, while another court
expressed the opposite concern—that state and local laws would
73
overenforce federal immigration law. These decisions elucidate how
preemption can give oblique expression to equal protection
arguments.
In the second pattern, the concern that a local ordinance would
undermine federal enforcement was the basis for District Court Judge
74
John Houston’s reasoning in Garrett v. City of Escondido, which
75
involved a challenge to a local ordinance in Escondido, California.
The ordinance penalized housing owners for “harbor[ing] an illegal
alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact
that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly
76
permitted by federal law.” City officials had to check an occupant’s
77
immigration status with the federal government.
Responding to a preemption challenge, Judge Houston blocked
enforcement with a temporary restraining order, reasoning that the

71. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608 (E.D. Va. 2004). The district
court allowed the claim to proceed subject to factfinding on whether Virginia relied on federal
standards, but it never decided that issue because it dismissed the plaintiffs’ preemption claim
for lack of standing. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655, 663–72 (E.D. Va. 2004);
see also Nathan G. Cortez, The Local Dilemma: Preemption and the Role of Federal Standards
in State and Local Immigration Laws, 61 SMU L. REV. 47, 53 (2008). For a similar insistence
that subfederal laws rely on federal immigration status, see Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of
Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861–62, 866–67, 869–71 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (granting a
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance); Villas at Parkside Partners v.
City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762, 766–69 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (granting a
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an ordinance mandating certification of
citizenship or immigration status to rent apartment property).
72. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
73. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527–28 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No.
07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
74. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
75. Id. at 1047–48.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1048.
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ordinance “could stand as a burden or obstacle to federal law.”
Unlike Judge T.S. Ellis in Equal Access Education—who would have
struck down the Virginia policy had it not relied on federal
79
immigration law categories —Judge Houston was concerned that
80
Escondido would use a federal database to check unlawful presence.
Considering how enforcement operates in practice, he explained,
“That the Ordinance uses the Immigration and Nationality Act to
define ‘illegal alien’ implies that it will likely place burdens on the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that will impede the
81
functions of those federal agencies.”
In a third pattern, overenforcing federal immigration law was
Judge Munley’s concern in Lozano v. City of Hazleton. Though he
82
rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument, Judge Munley
sustained the preemption challenge—even though the ordinances
relied on federal immigration status—because federal law struck a
different “balance between finding and removing undocumented
immigrants without accidentally removing immigrants and legal
citizens, all without imposing too much of a burden on employers and
83
workers.” It is wrong to assume, he explained, that “the federal
84
government seeks the removal of all aliens who lack legal status.”

78. Id. at 1057 (“The Court . . . has serious concerns regarding the burden this Ordinance
will place on federal regulations and resources.”).
79. Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602–08 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting
that the outcome of the case turned on “whether defendants’ admissions policies simply
adopted federal standards, in which case they are not invalid under the Supremacy Clause, or
instead create and apply state standards to assess the immigration status of applicants, in which
case the policies may run afoul of the Supremacy Clause”).
80. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. Several weeks later, the city consented to a
permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance, and to paying $90,000 in plaintiffs’
attorney fees. Garrett v. City of Escondido, No. 06CV2434JAH (NLS) (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006)
(order granting stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction). The state of California
responded with a statute that barred cities and counties from requiring landlords to inquire into
a prospective occupant’s immigration or citizenship status. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.3 (West
Supp. 2009). See generally California Legislative News, 84 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2495
(2007).
81. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42.
83. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 527–33. Compare Cortez, supra note 71, at 64
(expressing approval of this aspect of City of Hazleton), with Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 620–28 (2008)
(criticizing this aspect of City of Hazleton).
84. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
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Rather, “it is completely within the discretion of the federal officials
85
to remove persons from the country who are removable.”
I should acknowledge that unlike City of Escondido and City of
Hazleton, other cases have rejected preemption challenges to state
86
and local laws. But my purpose in discussing these decisions is not to
restate the prevailing doctrine on preemption. My purpose
throughout this Article is to analyze and connect emerging patterns of
argument and decisionmaking that may or may not become routine or
prevalent. In the context of state and local laws, I want to explain why
it matters that a court sustains a preemption challenge when an
individual rights challenge based on equal protection fails or is never
brought. These reasoning patterns show how preemption may
substitute partially for equal protection by striking down state and
local laws when equal protection challenges might not succeed in
doing so.
The explanation begins by noting that the meaning of unlawful
presence is heavily contested. Some observers view determinations of
federal immigration status as largely ministerial, and they urge state
and local officials to act on these straightforward findings of illegality
by impeding access to work and housing, and even by arresting
87
unauthorized migrants. But according to the view of unlawful
presence in City of Escondido and City of Hazleton, a noncitizen’s
actual removal from the United States and other facets of
immigration law enforcement reflect complex, highly discretionary
choices. It matters who allocates resources and picks enforcement

85. Id. at 530–31. Relatedly, the court noted that only federal immigration judges can
determine immigration law status. Id. at 533.
86. Some of these decisions rely on a provision of federal immigration law that may
expressly authorize some state employer sanctions laws. See INA § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(h)(2) (2006). Courts are divided on whether this savings clause allows state laws that
penalize employers through business licensing schemes. Compare City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp.
2d at 519–20 (finding preemption notwithstanding this provision), with Chicanos Por La Causa,
Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864–66 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed sub nom. U.S.
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 78 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. July 24, 2009) (No. 90-115)
(finding that this provision authorizes state licensing-based employer sanctions), and Gray v.
City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV0081ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *9–12 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008)
(same). State laws might be invalidated if the savings clause is construed to give preemptive
effect to IRCA. Cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765–71 (10th Cir.
2010) (granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of various Oklahoma state
laws based on a likelihood of success in challenging some provisions on preemption grounds).
87. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 11. For a discussion of the range of views of the meaning
of unlawful presence and how this range explains some of the deep disagreements about
immigration outside the law, see Motomura, supra note 2, at 2044, 2047–55.
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targets and who balances enforcement goals against competing
88
concerns.
What are these competing concerns? If some judges are troubled
when state or local initiatives vary from federal enforcement, what
exactly troubles them? One concern, cited in City of Hazleton, is that
cumbersome enforcement of employer sanctions may hamper
89
business efficiency. Although this is true enough, the most forceful
and often repeated criticism of state and local involvement in
immigration enforcement is improper reliance on race and ethnicity.
This criticism does not necessarily object to the enforcement of
immigration laws or argue that immigration laws have not been
broken. Rather, the concern is that not only unauthorized migrants,
but also lawfully present U.S. citizens and noncitizens, will suffer
90
targeting and discrimination by race and ethnicity.
In this setting, preemption-based skepticism of state and local
enforcement can give expression to concerns about discrimination.
An equal protection challenge would require proof of discriminatory
intent, but a preemption challenge can persuade some judges based
on reasonable possibility of discriminatory intent. One wonders if the
court in City of Hazleton would have found preemption if the
plaintiffs had not introduced so much evidence on race and ethnicity.
Though that evidence was insufficient to sustain an equal protection
claim, it is hard to read Judge Munley’s discussion of local variance
from federal enforcement in his preemption analysis without also
considering his discussions of demographic shifts in Hazleton, his
analysis of the atmosphere of intimidation of local Latino residents,
and his appendix on U.S. immigration history, which emphasized the
91
historical role of racial exclusion.

88. For a discussion of the meaning of unlawful presence, the role of states and cities, and
how these issues are linked, see Motomura, supra note 2, at 2047–65.
89. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 525–29.
90. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44
U.S.F. L. REV. 307, 318–20 (2009) (describing racial profiling in immigration raids); Huyen
Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement
of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 982–83 (2004);
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1084, 1104 (2004); Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement: State and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 113, 119 (2007).
91. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (mentioning demographic shifts); id. at 508–10
(discussing reasons to allow some plaintiffs to proceed anonymously); id. at 556–63 (outlining
the history of U.S immigration law and policy).
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Put differently, preemption and equal protection can function
roughly as alternative vehicles for expressing concern about racial
and ethnic discrimination. Plaintiffs will likely lose an equal
protection argument because of the law’s requirement of
discriminatory intent and its presumption against finding it. A
preemption argument can manage doubt differently by shifting the
risk of uncertain knowledge from the plaintiff to state and local
governments. Courts may sustain preemption challenges out of
concern that state and local laws addressing unauthorized migration
give state and local actors a zone of discretion that is too broad
92
because it enables improper reliance on race and ethnicity.
Because not all judges will view preemption like the court in City
of Hazleton, the future success of any such preemption-based
institutional competence argument is uncertain. But, as an approach
to argument and analysis, preemption offers a middle ground in
constitutional challenges to subfederal laws. It leaves intact the likely
rejection of equal protection claims, which under prevailing doctrine
would require either extending the antidiscrimination norm in
Graham from lawful permanent residents to unauthorized migrants,
or relaxing the requirements for proving unlawful discrimination on
the basis of race or ethnicity. At the same time, preemption avoids
relegating unauthorized migrants to a zone without constitutional
protections. This might be the result if courts reject not only equal
protection challenges based on discrimination by race, ethnicity, and
unlawful immigration status, but also preemption challenges.
What explains this middle ground? This is really two questions.
One asks how preemption, as an institutional competence argument,
serves as a compromise. Part of the answer is that preemption of state
and local laws affecting immigrants reflects a reliance on the political
process, especially on transparency and deliberation in a larger
federal policy arena with a more complex array of counterweights
93
than would shape state or local decisionmaking. With regard to
unauthorized migrants, if laws and policies must be enacted
nationally, then many that raise constitutional concerns—such as
92. This pattern bears some resemblance to the concerns expressed by the New York
Court of Appeals in Aliessa v. Novello. See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
93. For an illuminating discussion of the analogous value of transparency and deliberation
in national security cases, see Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661 (2009). Muscular procedure, by emphasizing
“transparency and deliberation,” is closer to institutional competence arguments than to the
procedural surrogates discussed in Part II.
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racial or ethnic discrimination—might never be adopted. Practically,
this is a form of constitutional avoidance. Preemption doctrine avoids
serious constitutional questions about the efficacy of arguments based
on an individual right like equal protection by enabling an
institutional competence argument, which in turn forces government
decisionmaking into a federal forum that makes a constitutionally
doubtful statute less likely.
At the same time, preemption arguments that allow the oblique
assertion of equal protection rights can have other, unintended
consequences because preemption is a double-edged sword. For
example, limits on state and local laws targeting unauthorized
migrants may also restrict the ability of state and local authorities to
adopt policies that support or protect unauthorized migrants. In this
way, these oblique rights generate dilemmas for advocates on all
sides. Those who oppose in-state tuition for unauthorized students
95
may argue that state authority is preempted, yet argue against the
preemption of state and local laws that seek to reduce unauthorized
96
population by attrition.
The second question is more fundamental: why does preemption
as a middle ground have such appeal? The answer goes back to the
idea of discretion in immigration law enforcement, and why this
discretion is unusually broad. Here, as is often true when the topic is
immigration outside the law, it is useful to return to Plyler. In that
case, Justice Brennan acknowledged that because of a tolerance of a
“‘shadow population’ of illegal migrants,” even noncitizens who lack
any avenues of relief and whose presence in the United States is
clearly unlawful are unlikely to be apprehended, let alone adjudicated

94. See Neuman, supra note 2, at 1436–37 (explaining why “[l]ocal anti-foreign movements
may have difficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades”). But cf. Peter J. Spiro,
Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1635 (1997) (“[A] state
disempowered from acting in its own jurisdiction will get its way at the national level in the
absence of strong countervailing interests on the part of other states . . . .”). For a discussion of
this phenomenon in the context of subfederal restrictions on speech, see Adam Winkler, Free
Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 160–63 (2009) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Professor Winkler’s study does not include First
Amendment challenges to local laws that restrict the activities of day laborers, but it would be
illuminating to see if judicial responses to such challenges revealed patterns similar to what I
discuss here.
95. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 524–25 (Ct.
App. 2008), review granted, 198 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2008).
96. See, e.g., City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
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as violators and deported. Similarly, Justice Powell commented in
his concurrence on the long history of labor migration to the United
98
States, particularly from Mexico.
A generation after Plyler, Justice Brennan’s observations remain
accurate. Even if enforcement has often been visible and severe,
chronic and intentional underenforcement of immigration law has
99
been the de facto U.S. federal policy for over a century. Today, even
more than a generation ago, enforcement resources are a mere
fraction of what would be needed for a significant reduction in
immigration outside the law. The reasons for this defy easy summary,
but they include the needs and political clout of U.S. employers, as
well as broad reluctance to erect border barriers that may not be costeffective and adopt databases and detection methods that may be
100
error-prone and intrusive.
Moreover, tolerating a substantial
unauthorized population and then periodically conferring lawful
status through discretionary relief or legalization may better meet the
U.S. economy’s needs than trying to identify worthy immigrants in
101
advance.
Against this national policy backdrop, an unsurprising middle
ground recognizes the individual rights of unauthorized migrants,
albeit indirectly and incompletely, through institutional competence
arguments, especially preemption. Similar patterns of oblique rights
appear in other substantive areas in which unauthorized migrants
seek legal remedies. Parts II, III, and IV show that these oblique
rights have emerged in several patterns that go beyond—yet are
closely related to— institutional competence arguments.
II. WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
Typical workplace laws give employees some protection with
regard to wages and hours, labor organizing, health and safety, and
97. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982).
98. Id. at 237–38 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. For more information on this de facto policy and its history, see MOTOMURA, supra
note 7, at 129–35; Gerald P. López, Undocumented Mexican Migration, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615,
641–72 (1981); Motomura, supra note 2, at 2047–55.
100. See David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 544–45 (2007) (noting that interest groups have slowed legislative
efforts to reduce unauthorized migration).
101. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law,
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 844–49 (2007) (arguing that the current enforcement system screens ex
post and explaining why this may be preferable to screening ex ante).
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employment discrimination, among other concerns. At the same time,
immigration law forbids not only unlawful presence but also the
employment of unauthorized workers. The latter is the target of the
employer sanctions in the Immigration Reform and Control Act
102
(IRCA) of 1986. What happens when an employee seeks work law
103
protection, but is barred by immigration law from working?
The modern answer starts with a case that began in May 1988,
when someone going by the name of Jose Castro applied for a job at
104
the Hoffman Plastic Compounds factory in Panorama, California.
He had a birth certificate showing that he was born in El Paso, plus a
105
Social Security card and a California state identification card.
Around Christmas 1988, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, started to organize the plant
106
with the help of some workers, including Castro. In January 1989,
management heard about the drive and laid off nine employees,
107
including Jose Castro.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that
Hoffman Plastic had violated federal labor law by laying off
108
employees because of their union activity. The proceedings also
revealed that Castro was using a borrowed birth certificate, and that
109
he was not in the United States legally, nor authorized to work.
Could the Board still award him the normal remedy—backpay for
what he would have worked had he not been discharged illegally?
110
The Board did so, but in 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed by a
111
5–4 vote in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, holding
that an employee who violates federal immigration law by working

102. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
(2006) (prohibiting the employment of unauthorized aliens).
103. See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 1041 (“With the passage of IRCA, the border law has
become a labor law as well.”).
104. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
105. For a fuller account of the case, see Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story
of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for
Undocumented Immigrants, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 311, 351 (David A. Martin & Peter H.
Schuck eds., 2005).
106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 140–41.
109. Id. at 141.
110. Id. at 141–42.
111. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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cannot receive backpay from an employer who unlawfully discharges
112
him.
Several court decisions since Hoffman have tried to define the
limits that the Supreme Court put on remedies for unauthorized
workers when employers violate work law. Some post-Hoffman cases
involve federal law, including other aspects of the National Labor
113
114
Relations Act (NLRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
115
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Other cases have arisen
under various state laws relating to work, such as state worker
compensation laws and state-law analogues to federal laws.
This Part’s inquiry into workplace rights broadens Part I’s
analysis of individual rights and institutional competence arguments
in challenges to state and local laws addressing unauthorized
migration. First, these workplace rights are not constitutional rights.
Though they have some constitutional aspects, these rights originate
in statutes that govern the workplace or in the common law of
contracts and torts.
Second, unauthorized migrants can assert workplace rights by
making several types of arguments in addition to the institutional
competence arguments discussed in Part I. Unauthorized migrants
can sometimes assert their workplace rights by showing that their
employer has engaged in comparatively more serious wrongdoing, an
approach that I call comparative culpability. Another argument is
that U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents may suffer if
unauthorized workers are denied remedies. I call this a citizen proxy
argument. A third argument challenges the procedures for reaching
or applying a decision rather than the substance of the decision itself.
This is a procedural surrogate argument. This Part concludes by
explaining how any of these four arguments can be effective when
they raise pragmatic concerns grounded in the integration of
unauthorized workers into the U.S. economy. The combined result is
that unauthorized migrants are able to assert their rights obliquely in

112. Id. at 151–52. The employer, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, had discharged Castro
without knowing that he was not authorized to work.
113. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150–69 (2006).
114. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2006). For
examples, see Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004); Escobar v. Spartan
Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
115. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006). For examples, see Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1056 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
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ways that mirror societal ambivalence about their presence—here, in
the context of the workplace.
A. Comparative Culpability
Judges may weigh a worker’s violation of immigration law either
against a violation by that individual worker’s employer, or against
violations by employers of unauthorized workers generally. As a
result, courts may obliquely recognize the rights of an unauthorized
worker even when such recognition might seem foreclosed. The
Hoffman majority suggested the relevance of such a comparison
when it reasoned that Jose Castro’s wrongdoing was not just working
without authorization; he admittedly used false documents to obtain
employment. The majority concluded that this violation of
116
immigration made Castro ineligible for backpay. Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion in Hoffman also addressed Jose Castro’s
wrongdoing but tempered its consequences in two ways. One is the
focus on comparative culpability discussed here. The second is the
citizen proxy argument discussed in the next Section.
With regard to comparative culpability, Justice Breyer
emphasized in Hoffman that Castro’s employer fired him—“a crude
117
and obvious violation of the labor laws.” To deny backpay would
give employers incentives to hire unauthorized workers, thereby
118
undercutting immigration law enforcement. This focus on an
employer’s comparative culpability is more explicit in a trilogy of
cases from the state of New York addressing unauthorized workers’
ability to recover lost future wages as a remedy for workplace
injuries. In all three cases, the injuries were attributable to an
employer’s violation of occupational safety requirements under New
York state statutes. All three injured employees were federal
immigration law violators. All three sued for future lost wages
because the injuries left them unable to return to work. And all three
employers argued that the injured workers could not claim lost wages
because they were not authorized to work.

116. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148–50; see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the
Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1393–95 (2009) (discussing employer
and employee wrongdoing in Hoffman and characterizing Hoffman as a “guiltyworker/innocent-employer scenario”).
117. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 155–56.
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In the first case, Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, the New York
Court of Appeals found that Hoffman does not bar unauthorized
120
workers from claiming lost wages. Distinguishing Hoffman as a case
involving a worker who “criminally provided his employer with
fraudulent papers,” the Court of Appeals reasoned that the
121
employers in Balbuena were blameworthy. The court noted the lack
of evidence that “plaintiffs produced false work documents in
violation of IRCA or were even asked by the employers to present
122
the work authorization documents as required by IRCA.”
Similar reliance on comparative culpability led the Second
Circuit to reach the same result in Madeira v. Affordable Housing
123
Foundation, Inc. “Nothing in the trial record indicates that Madeira
himself used any false identification to obtain work in the United
States; such action was apparently unnecessary given his brother’s
willingness to hire him despite knowing Madeira’s undocumented
124
status.” Focusing on the specific document-related prohibitions in
IRCA—as opposed to a more general sense of culpability that might
be associated with unauthorized work itself—the Second Circuit
summed up: “it was the employer and not the worker who violated
125
IRCA by arranging for employment.”
The same emphasis on comparative culpability led to the
126
opposite outcome in Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Avenue LLC. District
Judge Barbara Jones denied lost future wages to a worker who
127
affirmatively presented false documents, distinguishing Balbuena
and Madeira as cases in which the employers failed to ask for
128
identification and work authorization documents.
Noting this
difference, Judge Jones explained: “Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages
must be dismissed because Plaintiff is an undocumented alien who

119. Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E. 2d 1246 (N.Y. 2006).
120. Id. at 1258–61.
121. Id. at 1258.
122. Id. (“[I]n the context of defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment, we must
presume that it was the employers who violated IRCA by failing to inquire into plaintiffs’
immigration status or employment eligibility.”).
123. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found. Inc., 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
124. Id. at 223–24.
125. Id. at 228.
126. Ambrosi v. 1085 Park Ave. LLC, No. 06-CV-8163(BSJ), 2008 WL 4386751 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2008).
127. Id. at *13.
128. Id. at *12–13.
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knowingly used fraudulent documentation to obtain employment . . .
129
in violation of IRCA.”
So far I have discussed cases in which comparative culpability is a
matter of immigration law violations. In cases like Balbuena, Madeira,
and Ambrosi, any express or implied comparison involves the degree
to which an employer or employee violated IRCA’s scheme to
regulate unauthorized work. A more complete picture of comparative
culpability arguments by unauthorized workers requires analysis of
cases in which employee or employer wrongdoing reaches beyond
IRCA’s employer sanctions. Consider, for example, an unauthorized
worker’s claim that an employer has failed to pay wages as required
by the Fair Labor Standards Act for work performed. The prevailing
view is that working without authorization does not bar recovery of
130
such wages. Though these courts generally do not engage in the
explicit comparison apparent in Balbuena, Madeira, and Ambrosi, the
reasons articulated for including unauthorized employees within the
FLSA’s coverage rely on treating nonpayment of wages for past work
131
performed as more culpable than unauthorized work.
B. Citizen Proxies
In addition to comparative culpability, Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Hoffman suggested a second way of tempering the consequences of
Jose Castro’s wrongdoing: making citizen proxy arguments for
unauthorized workers’ rights. As with institutional competence
arguments and comparative culpability arguments, these citizen proxy
arguments allow unauthorized migrants to assert their rights
129. Id. at *13. This reliance on comparative culpability in workplace cases is consistent with
a basic theme in the treatment of unauthorized migrants in immigration law generally, which
opens up access to lawful immigration status when they have become victims, for example, of
domestic violence, trafficking, or other crimes. See Motomura, supra note 2, at 2086 (discussing
how immigration law treats victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other criminal activity as
distinct from unauthorized migrants).
130. Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1276–77 (N.D. Okla. 2006)
(recognizing unauthorized workers as employees under the FLSA); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 322–25 (D.N.J. 2005) (same); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc.,
230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (same); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463–
64 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058–59 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(same). See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 116, at 1370 & n.55 (discussing and
citing cases arising under the FLSA).
131. See, e.g., Chellen, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1279–81 (discussing the nature of employerdefendants’ violations of the FLSA); Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d. at 464 (noting the need to include
undocumented aliens within the protections of the FLSA to prevent “abusive exploitation” of
workers).
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obliquely—even when they may not be able to do so directly. When
Breyer analyzed the employer’s wrongdoing, he addressed not only
its comparative culpability but also what the systemic consequences in
the U.S. labor market would be if unauthorized workers were denied
132
remedies.
Though the Hoffman dissent considered the systemic effects on
labor union organizing, it did not describe or identify the types of
workers who would be protected by allowing the full range of NLRA
remedies for unauthorized workers. In contrast, Agri Processor Co. v.
133
NLRB, issued in 2008 by a District of Columbia Circuit panel, did
so. In Agri Processor, employees had voted to join the United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, but the company refused
recognition on the ground that most of those who voted were not
134
authorized to work. The issue was whether unauthorized workers
are “employees” under the NLRA for purposes of establishing an
135
employer’s duty to bargain. Judge David Tatel, the author of the
court of appeals decision in Hoffman that the U.S. Supreme Court
later overturned, wrote for the Agri Processor majority. Rejecting the
employer’s two main arguments, the majority held that unauthorized
workers must be included in the NLRA and that the same bargaining
136
unit may include both authorized and unauthorized workers.
The reasoning in Agri Processor reached back in time before
Hoffman to the 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
137
NLRB, which had held—two years before IRCA introduced federal
employer sanctions—that unauthorized workers are employees under
138
the NLRA. Did IRCA and Hoffman change the NLRA’s definition
of employee as interpreted by Sure-Tan? Agri Processor reasoned
that IRCA had not addressed the NLRA definition expressly or
impliedly. The court also distinguished Hoffman on the ground that it

132. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In contrast, the majority was
concerned with a different systemic effect, namely, incentives for future unauthorized workers
to come to the United States. Thus, the majority observed that allowing backpay for Castro
“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone
prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations.” Id. at 151 (majority
opinion).
133. Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 2–8.
136. Id. at 8–9.
137. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
138. Id. at 891–92.
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addressed only remedies, and not the coverage of NLRA generally.
This formal distinction, however, mattered much less than a basic
difference between Agri Processor and the Hoffman majority in
understanding the relationship between immigration law and labor
law.
Addressing the rights of unauthorized workers, Judge Tatel
discussed the interests of workers, authorized and unauthorized alike.
He found that immigration law status is not relevant to determining
whether workers in the same workplace share a “community of
140
interest,” which is the NLRB’s test for defining bargaining units.
Tatel reasoned that, with respect to “wages, benefits, skills, duties,
working
conditions,
and
supervision
of
the
employee, . . . undocumented workers and legal workers in a
141
bargaining unit are identical.” He continued, “While undocumented
aliens may face penalties for violating immigration laws, they receive
the same wages and benefits as legal workers, face the same working
conditions, answer to the same supervisors, and possess the same
142
skills and duties.”
Agri Processor and the Hoffman dissent—which both stand in
sharp contrast to the approach of the Hoffman majority—articulated
a relationship between immigration law and workplace law that
emphasizes the practical ties between unauthorized migrants and
other persons whose welfare depends on how the law treats the
unauthorized. Agri Processor reasoned that excluding unauthorized
workers from labor organizing under the NRLA can harm coworkers
who are U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise
143
working lawfully. The Hoffman dissent reasoned that failure to fully
enforce the NRLA would incentivize employers to hire unauthorized
workers, thus undermining the workplace welfare (or the jobs) of
144
citizens and lawful noncitizens. According to this view, the interests
of all workers in the workplace community of interest may depend on
how unauthorized workers are treated.

139. Agri Processor, 514 F.3d at 3–8.
140. Id. at 8–9.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 7–8.
144. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153–56 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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To generalize, these citizen and lawful noncitizen workers act as
145
interest surrogates, or as citizen proxies for unauthorized workers.
The existence of these citizen proxy workers—even if based on the
U.S. labor market generally—is essential to the rationale for
workplace protections and remedies for noncitizens who work in
violation of immigration law. Citizen proxy arguments, like
institutional competence arguments, allow unauthorized migrants to
146
assert rights indirectly and obliquely.
Citizen proxies are also invoked elsewhere in the law governing
immigration and immigrants. In federal immigration law, for
example, the interests of any U.S.-citizen children may influence the
decision whether to remove noncitizen parents from the United
147
States. Evidence of sufficient hardship to children, and sometimes
to parents and siblings who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents, may be a factor that blocks deportation. Though it is not
easy to meet the threshold eligibility requirements for these forms of
relief, or to persuade the decisionmaker to exercise discretion
favorably, a significant number of unauthorized migrants can seek
148
relief through a child as a citizen proxy. The statutory vehicles are
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions that give
executive branch officials the discretionary authority to allow a
149
parent to stay. These federal immigration law provisions, like the
Agri Processor interpretation of federal labor law, allow citizen
proxies to give expression to the rights of unauthorized migrants.
Consistent with the purpose of this Article as an analysis of
emerging patterns, I am not suggesting that citizen proxy arguments
on behalf of unauthorized migrants are successful consistently or even
145. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 116, at 1389 (explaining how excluding
unauthorized workers would undermine the purpose of the FLSA).
146. Comparative culpability arguments work together with citizen proxy arguments when
concerns about harms to citizens are heightened because certain employers are identified as
especially culpable.
147. The statutory term for deportation is “removal.” See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
(2006) (setting out rules for conduct of removal proceedings).
148. One study found that in 2008, about four million U.S.-born children were living in
families with at least one parent who was an unauthorized migrant, a significant increase over
the 2.3 million in 2003. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 1, at 8.
149. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (providing for cancellation of removal for
certain nonpermanent residents). Inadmissibility and deportability waivers require and assess
hardship to a close relative who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. See, e.g., INA
§ 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (waiver of inadmissibility for certain crimes); id. § 212(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(i) (waiver of inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation); id. § 237, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(H) (waiver of deportability for certain misrepresentations).

MOTOMORA IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

1755

frequently. The government rejects many applications for
discretionary relief because they fail to show sufficient hardship to
150
close relatives who are U.S. citizens. Many noncitizens who would
151
benefit from such relief are not eligible to apply. Moreover, the
mere fact that citizen children will be taken out of the country by
their deported parents—or separated from their parents—is
152
insufficient to block removal. This aspect of prevailing doctrine may
reflect unease that any other rule would impede too many removals
of noncitizens who are otherwise deportable, given that the
Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on virtually all children
153
born on U.S. soil regardless of their parents’ immigration law status.
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to consider the
constitutional claims of U.S. citizens adversely affected by
154
government decisions on admission and expulsion. Notwithstanding
150. See, e.g., In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 322 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a
noncitizen did not establish eligibility for cancellation of removal because she failed to
demonstrate that her children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship from
her deportation); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. 2001) (finding the
respondent not eligible for cancellation of removal because he did not establish that his children
or parents would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he was deported).
151. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (requiring ten years of continuous
physical presence for eligibility to apply for cancellation of removal).
152. Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157–58 (3d Cir. 1977). The federal government
removed over 108,000 parents of U.S.-citizen children between 1997 and 2008. See OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NO. OIG-09-15, REMOVALS
INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 5–6 (2009),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-15_Jan09.pdf.
153. See Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 489 (1987)
(reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENS WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985)). There is a narrow exception for parents who are
diplomats representing foreign governments in the United States. See ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN,
MOTOMURA & FULLERTON, supra note 2, at 15–44. For a contrary reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra (presenting arguments that the Fourteenth
Amendment denies jus soli citizenship to U.S.-born children of unauthorized migrants).
154. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), tested the denial of a visa to the Belgian
Marxist scholar Ernst Mandel. Id. at 759. He sued, joined by several professors who had invited
him to speak at universities in the United States. Id. at 759–60. The plaintiffs claimed that
excluding Mandel due to ideology violated their First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association. Id. at 760. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), several families sued to challenge a
federal immigration statute that defined “child” to include the children of unwed mothers, but
not unwed fathers. Id. at 788–91. Some plaintiffs were citizens and lawful permanent residents
who sought to be reunited with their families. Id. at 790. The Supreme Court rejected both
constitutional challenges, declining to take seriously the argument that denying admission to
noncitizens can hurt citizens. Id. at 794–95; Mandel, 408 U.S. at 768–70. Several scholars have
discussed the relevance of effects on citizens to constitutional challenges to government
immigration decisions. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 373, 374 (2004) (arguing that an alien-centered approach to constitutional immigration
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these counterexamples in immigration law, however, this inquiry into
workplace protections shows that, even if unauthorized migrants
cannot directly assert their rights as fully as they could if they were
U.S. citizens, a decision like Agri Processor opens the door for
indirect recognition of their rights through citizen proxy arguments.
C. Procedural Surrogates
Another pattern is distinct but closely related to institutional
competence, comparative culpability, and citizen proxy arguments.
This fourth pattern consists of what I call procedural surrogate
arguments. I use this term to refer to judicial reliance on the rhetoric
of procedure and a traditional procedural rule to recognize the rights
of an unauthorized worker, even when principles of labor law or some
other substantive body of law might suggest that the worker’s claims
155
would be rejected. Procedural surrogates can operate closely in
conjunction with some of the other patterns that I have examined,
including institutional competence arguments and citizen proxy
arguments.
156
An instructive example is Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., decided in
2007 by the California Court of Appeals. At stake was a California
statute, adopted in response to Hoffman, that made immigration law
status irrelevant to the enforcement of state labor and employment
157
laws. Reyes arose when an employee claimed unpaid wages, and the
employer sought discovery on the employee’s immigration law
158
status. The employee then invoked this statute limiting evidence
law ignores the possibility that immigration law may injure citizens); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose
Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, Review Essay, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1567, 1584–86, 1601–02 (1997) (arguing for a focus on both aliens’ rights and citizens’ rights in
deciding questions of constitutional immigration law); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?:
Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1946–52 (1996) (book
review) (arguing for a national self-definition model of constitutional immigration law that
focuses on the rights of U.S. citizens and permanent residents).
155. For a discussion of analogous procedural surrogates in the constitutional aspects of
immigration law, see generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992).
156. Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 148 Cal. App. 4th 604 (Ct. App. 2007).
157. That statute was section 1171.5 of the California Labor Code, which provides:
For purposes of enforcing state labor and employment laws, a person’s immigration
status is irrelevant to the issue of liability, and in proceedings or discovery undertaken
to enforce those state laws no inquiry shall be permitted into a person’s immigration
status except where the person seeking to make this inquiry has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the inquiry is necessary in order to comply with federal
immigration law.
158. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 608–09.

MOTOMORA IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

1757

and civil discovery. The employer argued in turn that Hoffman, by
making remedies for work law violations depend on immigration law
159
status, preempted the statute. In Reyes, the California Court of
160
Appeals rejected this argument and upheld the state statute. In
doing so, the decision indirectly recognized the rights of unauthorized
migrants in several ways that operated together.
Reyes interwove elements of arguments based on citizen proxies,
institutional competence, and procedural surrogates. First, it included
the same sort of citizen proxy argument that appears in the Hoffman
dissent and in Agri Processor. In Reyes, the court expressed concern
about the systemic effects on the workplace of allowing employers to
161
pay employees substandard wages.
Second, by affording unauthorized workers protection in a rule
of relevance, Reyes articulated workplace protections using a vehicle
of traditional procedure. This indirect recognition of rights came in
the form of a procedural surrogate for substantive protection under
the California prevailing wage statute. Perhaps anticipating the
objection that state law workplace remedies for unauthorized workers
run afoul of federal immigration law as applied to the workplace by
Hoffman, the California Labor Code safeguards wages through a
procedural rule, not a stronger articulation of the substantive right to
162
the prevailing wage.
Closely tied to the use of a procedural surrogate in Reyes is a
third noteworthy analytical element: an institutional competence
argument. In essence, Reyes decided that state law should govern an
employer-employee dispute, federal immigration law should not
curtail state law remedies, and a state rule of evidence could drive this
163
analysis. This reasoning reflects reliance not only on a procedural
surrogate but also on an institutional competence argument—though
not the same type of institutional competence argument that has

159. Id. at 617. Of course, preemption was not an issue in Hoffman, which addressed the
relationship between two federal statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 104–12.
160. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 615–18.
161. Id. at 617–18.
162. For robust use of discovery as a procedural surrogate that is similar but less explicit, see
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004), which denied discovery of employees’
immigration status in a Title VII suit against their employer, id. at 1074. On privacy as a barrier
to formal discovery of immigration and citizenship status, see Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1137, 1185–88 (2008).
163. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 608–19.
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invalidated state and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants.
Recall that the institutional competence argument in City of Hazleton
164
was a preemption argument against state and local authority. In
Reyes, institutional competence argued against preemption and in
165
favor of state law. States have institutional competence not only to
govern procedure in their own courts, but also to regulate
employment. Making the latter point, the Reyes court said that
“[b]ecause legislation providing for the payment of prevailing wages
comes under the historic police powers of the state, the presumption
166
is that legislation is not superseded by the IRCA.” This statement is
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions characterizing
employment as an area of traditional state regulation.
D. The Effectiveness of Oblique Rights in the Workplace
Why should arguments based on comparative culpability, citizen
proxies, procedural surrogates, and institutional competence
sometimes allow unauthorized migrants to assert their workplace
rights obliquely? The answer to this question starts by identifying a
spectrum of ways to understand and argue for the rights of
unauthorized migrants.
At one end of the spectrum are pragmatic arguments that
implicitly concede that unauthorized migrants’ claims of right are
weak, but emphasize that any refusal to sustain their claims will
adversely affect persons with stronger claims. Consider the arguments
that were typically made by opponents of California’s Proposition
187. Had a federal court not found federal preemption, Proposition
187 would have barred access by unauthorized migrants to most state
public services, including nonemergency health care and public
167
education.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 37–42.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 156–60.
166. Reyes, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 616.
167. Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and Reporting., Proposition
187, 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE, CAL. GOV’T
CODE, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, CAL. PENAL CODE and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE). It
also would have required certain state and local government employees to verify the
immigration status of persons whom they encountered in their duties, and to report all
suspected unauthorized migrants to federal immigration officials. In addition, Proposition 187
introduced substantial new criminal penalties for manufacturing, selling, and using false
documents. A federal court found that all but the criminal penalties were preempted. See
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.D. Cal. 1997);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The

MOTOMORA IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

1759

As Professor Linda Bosniak has analyzed, the arguments against
Proposition 187 “emphasiz[ed] the initiative’s negative consequences
168
for Americans’ own self-interest” —for example, that denying health
care to the unauthorized population would jeopardize the public
169
health of all Californians, including U.S. citizens. These were
pragmatic arguments. In contrast, moral arguments on behalf of the
170
unauthorized migrants were rarely heard in the debate.
Like pragmatic public health arguments against Proposition 187,
the arguments based on comparative culpability and citizen proxies
are pragmatic—though pragmatic in the context of judicial
decisionmaking rather than the political arena that Bosniak analyzed.
These pragmatic arguments appeal in the workplace setting to
concerns about the broader consequences if judges decline to
recognize certain rights of unauthorized migrants. In the Hoffman
dissent, the citizen proxies were lawful workers in general, who might
have been adversely affected if employers had incentives to hire
171
unauthorized workers instead. Comparative culpability arguments
appeal to the same concerns about the potential adverse effects on
lawful workers of letting egregious employer behavior go unchecked.
But these arguments for workplace rights can be more focused
than the pragmatic arguments against Proposition 187, or those in the
Hoffman dissent. The citizen proxies in Agri Processor were in the
172
same workplace, and thus more specifically identifiable as directly
affected if the NLRA scheme for organizing and collective bargaining
excluded unauthorized workers in the same plant. And in the
immigration law settings that I have described, citizen proxies are
individually identifiable as directly affected because they lay the
foundation for discretionary relief from removal.
These pragmatic arguments allow unauthorized migrants’
workplace rights to be recognized indirectly in ways that function like
institutional competence arguments in the context of challenging state

case settled while on appeal. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Talks Offered Davis Few
Choices, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at A3.
168. Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 558 (1996).
169. Id. at 563.
170. See id. at 563, 566.
171. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153–56 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 144.
172. Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also supra text
accompanying notes 133–43.
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and local laws targeting unauthorized migrants. Relevant again is
pervasive ambivalence about immigration law enforcement, this time
in the workplace. The impulse in recent years to ramp up
enforcement efforts is in tension with the enduring reality that
migrant labor represents a crucial component of economic growth.
173
Federal law did not prohibit hiring unauthorized workers until 1986,
174
when IRCA introduced employer sanctions, which have been
ineffective. Fake green cards and other false documents are readily
175
available, and employers only need to check if an identity or work
authorization document “reasonably appears on its face to be
176
genuine.” As long as employers check documents and do the
177
paperwork, their risk of liability under the statute is minimal.
178
Further probing only opens them to discrimination claims.
Worksite enforcement is evolving rapidly. A few years ago,
unauthorized work was virtually never detected because enforcement
179
relied on workplace raids, which rarely took place. This changed in
173. In 1952, Congress made it a felony to harbor an alien unlawfully in the United States
and expanded the Border Patrol’s enforcement authority. At the insistence of southwestern
growers and other agricultural interests, Congress added the so-called Texas Proviso, which
excluded the employment of an unauthorized worker from the definition of harboring. Act of
June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163, 228–29; see also ROGER DANIELS,
GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE
1882, at 121 (2004) (discussing the background of the Texas Proviso); MOTOMURA, supra note
7, at 177 (same); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
CONTROL IN AMERICA 194 (2002) (same). When IRCA became law in 1986, at least twelve
states had some kind of employer sanctions law. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION &
REFUGEE POL’Y, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT
OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 565 (1981).
174. See INA § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006) (prohibiting employment of unauthorized
aliens).
175. See Wayne A. Cornelius, The U.S. Demand for Mexican Labor, in MEXICAN
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 25, 43–
44 (Wayne A. Cornelius & Jorge A. Bustamante eds., 1989) (surveying California employers
who describe the ease with which undocumented workers attain false identification).
176. INA § 274A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A); see also Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v.
INS, 948 F.2d 549, 553–54 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the employer did not violate
§ 1324a(b)(1)(A) by failing to closely inspect the employee’s social security card or compare it
to an example in the INS handbook, and observing that “Congress intended to minimize the
burden and the risk placed on the employer in the verification process”).
177. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of
White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1046–55, 1057, 1060 (1990) (describing
employer reactions to IRCA sanctions and illustrating the degree to which employers are,
paradoxically, protected by IRCA despite their employment of undocumented workers).
178. INA § 274B(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). This requires discriminatory intent. Id.
179. See Lack of Worksite Enforcement and Employer Sanctions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
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the winter of 2006–2007, when worksite enforcement surged
180
upward. In one highly publicized case in the last year of President
George W. Bush’s administration, the federal government brought
criminal charges against unauthorized workers arrested at a meat
181
packing plant in Postville, Iowa. The Obama administration has
shifted policy priorities away from workplace raids to aggressive
182
checks for unauthorized workers using electronic databases.
The recent upsurge in worksite enforcement has not changed the
U.S. economy’s overall reliance on over seven million unauthorized
workers, an estimated 5 percent of the total U.S. workforce. The
183
percentage is much higher in certain occupations and industries. As
long as the lawful admission scheme remains unable to provide a
steady supply of workers, employers in the U.S. economy will depend
184
heavily on the availability of an unauthorized workforce, and
employers will push back if government enforcement becomes too
185
strict.

Cong. 7 (2005) (testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office) (describing how worksite enforcement was and continues
to be a low priority for federal government agencies); JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION
GATEKEEPER: THE RISE OF THE “ILLEGAL ALIEN” AND THE MAKING OF THE U.S.-MEXICO
BOUNDARY 136 (2002) (discussing the low number of workplace inspectors and enforcement
actions in the late 1990s).
180. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Fact Sheet,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (showing the
total worksite enforcement arrests increasing from 1,292 in 2005 to 4,383 in 2006, 4,940 in 2007,
and 6,287 in 2008).
181. For a discussion of the Postville raid and an analysis of the trend toward criminal
prosecution of unauthorized migrants, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 21–56, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
182. See Neil A. Lewis, In Search for Illegal Workers, Immigration Officials Will Audit More
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A14 (describing the Obama administration’s use of
electronic databases to check for unauthorized workers); Julia Preston, Immigrant Crackdown
Leads to 1,800 Pink Slips, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A1 (describing the Obama
administration’s emphasis on forcing employers to dismiss employees instead of raiding
workplaces).
183. See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 1, at 14–17 (presenting data showing that
unauthorized immigrant workers remain overrepresented in low wage and low education
occupations).
184. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 223 (noting the
U.S. economy’s dependence on immigrants from Mexico and Latin America).
185. See Julia Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2008, at A1 (“Under pressure from the toughest crackdown on illegal immigration in two
decades, employers across the country are fighting back in state legislatures, the federal courts
and city halls.”).
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As long as fundamental ambivalence about enforcement
continues to prevail, it is an unsurprising middle ground for the rights
of unauthorized workers to be incomplete but recognized. And to the
extent that these citizen proxy arguments and comparative culpability
arguments reflect pragmatic concerns, they can join forces with
institutional competence and procedural surrogate arguments, both of
which allow judges to give expression to those concerns. This is not
only a way to protect the interests of citizens and lawfully present
noncitizens in the same workplace but also—as with unauthorized
migrants who are targeted by state and local laws—a way to recognize
their inevitable membership in those work-based communities
despite their status outside the law.
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Raids on homes, worksites, and other venues have always been
an immigration enforcement tool, but they have become more
186
frequent since about 2006. Though the Obama administration has
shifted away from workplace raids, a political imperative remains to
show a strong enforcement face to help lay the foundation for
comprehensive immigration reform. Many arrests and searches have
been found to violate the Fourth Amendment, and yet they uncover
evidence that is probative as to an arrested individual’s immigration
law status and thus as to whether she is potentially subject to removal
187
from the United States.
The government will seek to introduce this evidence in
immigration court, where an immigration judge will decide
removability and rule on any relief that may be available. The
noncitizen’s attorney (if the noncitizen has one) may file a motion to
suppress. May the government introduce evidence obtained through a
search and seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment? Though this
question affects a full range of noncitizens, including lawful
permanent residents and lawfully present nonimmigrants, my focus
here, as throughout this Article, is unauthorized migrants.
This inquiry into remedies for unlawful searches and seizures fills
in the picture drawn in Parts I and II of the patterns of oblique rights
186. In fiscal year 2002, the federal government arrested 510 unauthorized workers and
employers in workplace raids. Worksite arrests rose to 1,292 in fiscal year 2005 and then leapt to
4,940 in 2007. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, supra note 180.
187. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary
rule does not apply in civil deportation hearings held by the INS).
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asserted by unauthorized migrants. Courts have granted remedies in
this context to unauthorized migrants, sometimes by sustaining
arguments whose success is traceable to comparative culpability
arguments, citizen proxy arguments, and institutional competence
arguments. Part III also uncovers one new pattern: reliance on
subconstitutional reasoning to reach—even if less boldly—practically
the same results as if unauthorized migrants were the constitutional
equals of U.S. citizens. By “subconstitutional,” I mean an argument
based on statutes, regulations, or other sources of law less fixed than
the U.S. Constitution.
As was true of the patterns that emerged in the topics in Parts I
and II, all of these patterns of oblique rights involving search and
seizure are related in terms of their practical effect. And as with
successful arguments for unauthorized migrants’ workplace rights, the
persuasiveness of these arguments depends on pragmatic, rather than
moral, reasoning. These arguments rely on the consequences of
Fourth Amendment violations—and unlawful law enforcement
practices generally—on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
either because they will be arrested or searched, or because they have
close connections to noncitizens who will be arrested or searched.
Again, the integration of unauthorized migrants into U.S. society lays
the foundation for oblique rights.
A. Egregious Violations, Comparative Culpability, and Citizen
Proxies
The baseline rule for remedies in immigration proceedings for a
Fourth Amendment violation comes from the 1984 U.S. Supreme
188
Court decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in which the Court held
that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in deportation
189
proceedings. Justice O’Connor’s reasoning on behalf of a bare
majority of five Justices relied on weighing ‘‘the likely social benefits
190
of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against the likely costs.’’ A
major element of her reasoning was skepticism about the benefits of
excluding evidence. O’Connor observed that deportation would still
be possible in many cases without evidence from the arrest, few
enforcement officers would expect challenges to the circumstances of
the arrest, the government has its own scheme to deter Fourth
188. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
189. Id. at 1050.
190. Id. at 1041.
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Amendment violations, and alternative private remedies are
191
available. She then noted the ‘‘unusual and significant’’ costs of an
exclusionary rule, among them the cost of ‘‘requir[ing] the courts to
close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law,’’ thus complicating
192
the system of deportation proceedings.
Justice O’Connor also wrote that the Court’s “conclusions
concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there
developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations
193
by INS officers were widespread.” And she noted, “we do not deal
here with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other
liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and
194
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.” Three
other Justices joined this part of her opinion mentioning egregious
violations. Presumably, the four dissenters would agree, given that
they would have applied the exclusionary rule to all Fourth
195
Amendment violations.
Subsequent federal appeals courts have granted motions to
suppress evidence obtained through egregious violations of the
Fourth Amendment. These decisions vary in reasoning and result, but
several consistent elements have emerged. Most significantly, the
federal courts of appeals have almost uniformly found that it
constitutes an egregious violation to rely improperly on race or
ethnicity in conducting a search or seizure.
The foundational case addressing reliance on race and ethnicity
in conducting a search or seizure is the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court
196
decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. That case held that
immigration agents may not effect an investigative seizure of
suspected unauthorized migrants solely because of their “apparent
197
Mexican ancestry.” More generally, the Ninth Circuit considers a
Fourth Amendment violation egregious if committed “deliberately or
by conduct a reasonable officer should have known would violate the
198
Constitution.” Applying this standard in light of Brignoni-Ponce

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 1043–45.
Id. at 1046, 1048–50.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1050–51.
See Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Id. at 885–86.
Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 493.
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and similar decisions, a violation is egregious if an enforcement
199
decision is based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit has excluded, based on egregious violations of the Fourth
Amendment, evidence gathered when a vehicle was stopped solely
200
based on the passengers’ Hispanic appearance
and when a
noncitizen’s apartment was entered and searched, without consent or
201
a warrant, solely because he had a “Nigerian-sounding name.” The
Second Circuit has been disinclined to consider egregious a stop that
202
is not prolonged or accompanied by a show or use of force. But the
Second Circuit has ruled that, even if government conduct is not
severe, Fourth Amendment violations can be so improper as to call
for suppression. In one case, the court observed, “were there
evidence that the stop was based on race, the violation would be
203
egregious, and the exclusionary rule would apply.”
Examining search and seizure cases uncovers some of the same
patterns of indirect recognition of unauthorized migrants’ rights
revealed in Parts I and II. First, these search and seizure decisions
have much in common with the workplace cases in Part II. Asking if a
Fourth Amendment violation is egregious is a question about
comparative culpability, much like examining the degree of employer
wrongdoing in a lost wages decision like Balbuena, Madeira, or
204
Ambrosi. When police officers know or should know that they are
violating the Fourth Amendment—for example, by relying on race or
ethnicity to choose a search target—the stronger response of a
suppression order is appropriate. To be sure, the probative nature of
the suppressed evidence suggests a degree of noncitizen culpability
based on unlawful presence. But by offsetting the presumption that
199. See, e.g., Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (mem.) (holding
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not lawfully stop and question
individuals solely on the basis of Hispanic appearance). My concern in this Article is how
decisionmakers and litigants work within prevailing doctrine to decide on remedies once a
violation is established. For a thorough critique of doctrine defining a Fourth Amendment
violation—especially of what constitutes a search or seizure, and consent to a search or
seizure—see generally Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 946 (2002).
200. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1994).
201. Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 503.
202. See Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[E]xclusion may
well be proper where the seizure itself is gross or unreasonable in addition to being without a
plausible legal ground, e.g., when the initial illegal stop is particularly lengthy, there is a show or
use of force, etc.”).
203. Id. at 237.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 119–29.
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the illegality of a search does not lead to suppression of evidence, the
egregious violation rule allows Fourth Amendment remedies when
unauthorized migrants can show that law enforcement behavior tips
the comparative culpability analysis to the opposite result.
Second, suppression arguments that cite egregious Fourth
Amendment violations operate like citizen proxy arguments. Recall
the tension in Hoffman and in Agri Processor between an
unauthorized worker’s individual wrongdoing and systemic
consequences, which include effects on employer behavior as well as
coworkers who are citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise
205
authorized to work. The need to deter unlawful conduct by law
enforcement officers, even assuming that the individual who is the
object of enforcement is culpable, provides much of the rationale
behind the suppression remedy. A major part of the Court’s
reasoning in Lopez-Mendoza was that excluding evidence would have
insufficient deterrent value, given the availability of other measures
206
to deter and correct Fourth Amendment violations. Like in the
Hoffman dissent and the Agri Processor decision in the workplace
context, courts apply the exclusionary rule to protect citizen proxies.
The egregious violation decisions identify police misbehavior patterns
that may harm citizens and lawfully present noncitizens directly or
indirectly because of police officers’ use of excessive force or
disregard of warrant requirements, or because of their improper use
207
of race and ethnicity.
These observations about the search and seizure cases should
recall the contrast between moral and pragmatic arguments raised in
Part II’s discussion of citizen proxies and comparative culpability. An
argument for suppression can become a strong moral argument based
on an unauthorized migrant’s Fourth Amendment–based individual
rights claim, but only when the circumstances of an illegal search or
seizure suggest that the enforcing officer was comparatively culpable.
More reliably, a pragmatic rationale like the need to deter unlawful
law enforcement activity—especially racial or ethnic discrimination—
makes an argument for suppression much more persuasive.

205. See supra text accompanying notes 133–46.
206. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043–50 (1983).
207. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 693–711 (2000) (discussing racial profiling by immigration officers even in
the wake of the egregious violation decisions).
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This pragmatic approach to remedies is consistent with Justice
O’Connor’s observation in Lopez-Mendoza that it might be
appropriate to revisit remedies for Fourth Amendment violations if
evidence emerges that the government is not adequately controlling
and supervising immigration enforcement and constitutional
208
violations become widespread. Any such pragmatic approach to
suppression would invoke citizen proxies, namely, citizens who may
be harmed directly or indirectly by the same unlawful enforcement
practices.
B. Phantom Norm Arguments
This inquiry into remedies for unlawful searches and seizures
goes further than Parts I and II by revealing a fifth pattern of oblique
rights that unauthorized migrants can assert. An unauthorized
migrant seeking to exclude evidence from removal proceedings can
not only invoke the egregious violation exception to Lopez-Mendoza
but can also make a subconstitutional argument based on the
government’s own regulations.
An example of such subconstitutional reasoning is the February
2009 decision by Immigration Judge Ashley Tabaddor in Matter of
209
Perez-Cruz, which excluded evidence because ICE agents violated
federal regulations governing arrest and interrogation during
210
workplace raids. This use of a regulatory violation seems unusual
but merits examination in this analysis of emerging patterns. Deciding
suppression on subconstitutional grounds is not only logical but is also
consistent with other patterns in immigration law in which
constitutional reasoning has taken subconstitutional form.
Under one of the regulations involved in Perez-Cruz, even
briefly detaining an individual requires reasonable or individualized
208. For a detailed argument that developments since Lopez-Mendoza support application
of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings, see generally Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason
to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and
the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109.
209. In re Perez-Cruz, No. A95 748 837 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal. Feb. 9, 2009), appeal
filed.
210. Id., slip op. at 9–18; see also In re Herrera-Priego, No. [redacted], slip op. at 20–25
(Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y. July 10, 2003), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/practiceareas/
immigration/pdfs/web428.pdf (suppressing evidence and terminating removal proceedings
because the enforcement action violated the government agency’s own Operation Instructions
on enforcement at worksites involved in a labor dispute); Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: The
Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389,
389–93 (2004) (discussing Herrera-Priego).
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suspicion that the individual is unlawfully present in the United
211
States. Judge Tabaddor found no reasonable or individualized
212
suspicion that any of the workers were unlawfully present. The
raided plant was an electronic assembly facility owned and operated
by Micro Solutions Enterprise in Van Nuys, California. The issue in
the case was whether the workers were detained or instead free to
walk away when about one hundred Immigration and Customs
213
Enforcement agents entered the plant. The judge found that the
workers were detained and therefore seized when the armed and
uniformed agents ordered all workers to stop working and gather in a
214
large hallway.
To find a violation of law that made suppression appropriate,
Judge Tabaddor relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals decision
215
in Matter of Garcia-Flores, which held that removal proceedings
may be terminated when the government violates its own regulations
216
and infringes on the respondent’s rights. Under Garcia-Flores, a
regulatory violation justifies termination of removal proceedings only
if the violated regulation serves to benefit the noncitizen and the
violation “prejudiced interests of the alien which were protected by
217
the regulation.” Judge Tabaddor found that the Garcia-Flores
218
requirements were met in Perez-Cruz. She thus ordered suppression
219
and terminated the removal proceeding with prejudice.
An immigration judge’s authority to rule on issues of
constitutional law is limited. An immigration judge may, however,
make procedural rulings in removal proceedings as required by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, some
immigration judges have granted suppression motions based on the
220
egregious violation exception to Lopez-Mendoza. In contrast,

211. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)–(c) (2009).
212. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 14.
213. Id. at 11–14.
214. Id. at 11–13.
215. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325 (B.I.A. 1980).
216. Id. at 328–29.
217. Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir.
1979)).
218. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 16–18.
219. Id. at 18.
220. E.g., In re Reyes-Basurto, No. [redacted], slip op. at 7–9 (Immigration Ct. N.Y., N.Y.
May 28, 2009), available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NY-5-2809.pdf. For a list of additional decisions, see Legal Action Ctr., Am. Immigration Council,
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Perez-Cruz relied on a regulatory violation, adopting a
subconstitutional rationale, which yielded the same practical result as
221
the egregious violation exception.
Reliance on subconstitutional analogues to constitutional rules
bears some resemblance to other, more established uses of phantom
constitutional norms. As I have analyzed in detail in a previous
article, this is the practice of interpreting statutes and regulations to
avoid constitutional doubt even when the plenary power doctrine—
which ordinarily stifles constitutional judicial review—suggests that
the court would reject a noncitizen’s constitutional challenge to a
222
government decision pertaining to admission or expulsion. Over the
past twenty years, arguing for a phantom norm decision has gradually
become a standard strategy in litigation challenging government
immigration decisions. The success of this strategy no doubt prompts
plaintiffs in such cases to press such arguments when they can.
Several U.S. Supreme Court cases have invalidated government
decisions not on constitutional grounds, but by interpreting statutes to
avoid serious constitutional questions. Prominent among them are the
223
224
Court’s 2001 decisions in Zadvydas v. Davis and INS v. St. Cyr.
Zadvydas involved the indefinite detention of former permanent
resident noncitizens who had been ordered removed from the United
States but who could not be sent anywhere because no country would
225
accept them, not even their own country of citizenship. The
Supreme Court held that the INA did not authorize the government
to detain a noncitizen indefinitely, thus avoiding a decision on the
226
constitutionality of the indefinite detention of these noncitizens. In
St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that the INA did not eliminate the

Enforcement, Motions to Suppress, http://www.legalactioncenter.org/clearinghouse/litigationissue-pages/enforcement-motions-suppress (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
221. Perez-Cruz, slip op. at 17.
222. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). Examples of
phantom norm decisionmaking include interpretation of both statutes and regulations. See, e.g.,
id. at 570–71, 590–92 (discussing the interpretation of regulations in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846
(1985), and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)).
223. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). I should disclose that I served as a volunteer
consultant for the attorneys representing Kim Ho Ma, one of the petitioners in Zadvydas.
224. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). I should disclose that I co-authored an amicus
curiae brief in In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996), which first posed some of the
issues that St. Cyr later decided.
225. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86.
226. Id. at 696–99.
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jurisdiction of federal courts sitting in habeas corpus to review
removal orders, thus avoiding the question whether the abrogation of
habeas jurisdiction would violate the Suspension Clause of the U.S.
227
Constitution.
Perez-Cruz is an example of phantom norm decisionmaking. The
prevailing view is that the Fourth Amendment applies to interior
enforcement of the immigration laws against noncitizens who are in
228
the United States unlawfully. But Lopez-Mendoza curtailed the
practical protections of the Fourth Amendment by limiting the
remedies available in a certain type of proceeding in a certain type of
forum—removal proceedings in immigration court—that uniquely
229
involves noncitizens and especially affects unauthorized migrants.
Put more generally, constitutional doctrine evolved to create a
significant gap between the Fourth Amendment rights of
unauthorized migrants and those of U.S. citizens. In Perez-Cruz, as in
other applications of phantom norms, an unauthorized migrant who
could not directly demand a constitutional remedy could do so
indirectly by securing a subconstitutional remedy, based here on a
230
regulatory violation.

227. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308.
228. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990), might be read to suggest that unauthorized migrants lack constitutional protections
without some showing of connections to the United States. See id. at 271 (“These
cases . . . establish only that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.”). A few decisions have taken this suggestion seriously, but they seem to be outliers.
See United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1273 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that
“Ezparza-Mendoza—as a previously deported felon—lacks sufficient connection to this country
to assert a Fourth Amendment suppression claim”); United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 9640075 SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *16–18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 1997) (“The salient
issue . . . is whether defendant Guitterez has developed substantial connections with this
country . . . .”); Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 (Tex. App. 1991) (“We do not believe
that the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . apply to such illegal aliens, unless they have
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered a part of the community.”).
229. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984).
230. Perez-Cruz contrasts superficially with Zadvydas, where the threshold application of
the arguably relevant constitutional provision was in doubt. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696–97. The
issue in Perez-Cruz was not the application of the Fourth Amendment, but rather the remedy
for violations. In re Perez-Cruz, No. A95 748 837, slip op. at 16–18 (Immigration Ct. L.A., Cal.
Feb. 9, 2009), appeal filed. In both cases, however, a subconstitutional decision reached a result
that was more favorable for the noncitizen than a constitutional holding would have provided.
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C. Phantom Norms, Institutional Competence, and Citizen Proxies
Phantom norm arguments are closely related to institutional
competence arguments. The suppression cases that rely on phantom
norms to remedy Fourth Amendment violations reflect some of the
same values that underlie institutional competence arguments, such
as preemption in the decisions on state and local laws. Teasing out the
connection requires comparing the subconstitutional version of the
exclusionary rule in Perez-Cruz with the constitutional remedy
available if a court applied the egregious conduct exception, or if the
Supreme Court abrogated the general rule in Lopez-Mendoza.
Regulations appear to be a less robust form of law than statutes,
let alone constitutional provisions, because administrative agencies
can reverse regulations without congressional involvement. In
practical terms, however, regulations are more robust than they first
appear in setting standards for government conduct, and thus in
establishing the rights of unauthorized migrants. The key here is the
value of transparency and deliberation in setting the regulatory
standard, and then in preserving that standard against erosion or
repeal. This is similar to a clear statement requirement, which
provides that Congress may enact retroactive deportability grounds,
231
but must do so clearly. This requirement facilitates public awareness
about the legislative threat and allows those concerned about
retroactivity to make their objections heard. This shift from litigation
to politics need not diminish—and may even enhance—the rights of
unauthorized migrants in practical effect. In this regard, phantom
constitutional norms are closely related to institutional competence
arguments. Both types of inchoate rights rely on transparency,
deliberation, and structural requirements such as notice-andcomment procedures to offer some degree of protection to
unauthorized migrants.
The search and seizure cases also resume a thread on race and
ethnicity from Part I’s inquiry into state and local laws by showing
how unauthorized migrants can use various arguments to suppress
evidence from an unlawful search or seizure that may be
discriminatory. Recall that equal protection challenges to laws that
disadvantage noncitizens based on their unlawful immigration status
231. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315–17 (“Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has
affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that
it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film
Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 272–73 (1994))).
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have little or no traction outside of access to public K–12 education.
And it is very hard to sustain an equal protection challenge to such
laws based on race or ethnic discrimination, because courts require
proof of intent to discriminate by race or ethnicity. Some courts have
instead struck down state and local laws on institutional competence
232
grounds—especially that of federal preemption.
In some situations, courts may recognize the rights of
unauthorized migrants under the Fourth Amendment as an
alternative to both equal protection and preemption. Like
preemption, a Fourth Amendment challenge channels concerns about
discrimination away from the unreceptive form of a broad challenge
to a state or local policy—for example, the equal protection argument
233
that failed in City of Hazleton. But the law of Fourth Amendment
remedies—whether based on egregious violations or regulatory
violations—can recognize the improper use of race or ethnicity in
ways that differ from preemption. Most significantly, Fourth
Amendment remedies can rely on evidence pertaining to a single
incident, not needing the broader allegations that defeating a state or
local law might require.
The availability of Fourth Amendment remedies can make a
difference partly because not all courts find state or local decisions
preempted, but also because preemption does not apply to federal
immigration enforcement at all. Those who challenge state and local
laws and practices that target unauthorized migrants may try equal
protection and preemption challenges that are harder to win but
broader in systemic effect if successful. Or they may try a Fourth
Amendment argument that may be easier to prove but narrower in its
direct effect, literally limited to an individual case.
More generally, this Part’s inquiry into search and seizure—like
the inquiries into state and local laws and workplace rights—shows
how unauthorized migrants have oblique rights that indirectly and
incompletely correspond to the rights that U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents may assert in the same circumstances. And once
again, these patterns of argument reflect a degree of integration of
these unauthorized migrants into U.S. society despite their formal
position outside the law. But in contrast to the workplace integration
that was key to the patterns discussed in Part II, the integration that
matters for similar patterns in search and seizure is integration more
232. See supra text accompanying notes 50–61.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 37–42.
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broadly into communities that consist of citizens and noncitizens,
some of whom are in the United States lawfully, and some of whom
are not.
IV. THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not support
a right to counsel in immigration proceedings, according to longstanding precedent. The doctrinal reason is that the U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently found that deportation is not criminal
234
punishment.
Were the law otherwise, indigent noncitizens in
removal proceedings would be appointed counsel at no cost, the same
way that indigent criminal defendants are appointed public defenders.
Absent Sixth Amendment protection, any right to counsel in
immigration proceedings must be based on the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process of law. The U.S. Supreme Court has
declared as a general proposition that the Fifth Amendment applies
235
to all persons on U.S. territory. But no judicial decision has
interpreted the U.S. Constitution to require as a general rule that
noncitizens in removal proceedings be appointed counsel. The closest
that any court has come to requiring this is the Sixth Circuit’s 1975
236
decision in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,
which held that the
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel if necessary for
237
“fundamental fairness.” But research reveals no reported decision
that has invoked this or any similar test to decide that counsel should
be appointed. Reflecting the prevailing interpretations of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, the INA and its accompanying regulations

234. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“A deportation proceeding is a purely civil
action . . . .”); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960) (“[D]eportation proceedings are
not subject to the constitutional safeguards for criminal prosecutions.”); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (“Deportation . . . has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a
criminal procedure.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893) (“‘Deportation’ is the removal of an alien out of the
country . . . without any punishment . . . .”).
235. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–16 (1982) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment protects aliens
whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal
Government.”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [Fifth Amendment] protection.”).
236. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050
(1976).
237. Id. at 569.
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provide that noncitizens in removal proceedings have a right to
238
counsel, but not at the government’s expense.
Constitutional doctrine on the right to appointed counsel seems
239
settled, notwithstanding cogent objections voiced by many. Given
this clarity, the most contentious questions in recent years have
involved not the presence or absence of appointed counsel but what
happens when counsel is ineffective. This topic is the fourth and final
inquiry of this Article: Is there a right to effective counsel in removal
proceedings in immigration court? This Part shows how unauthorized
migrants, whose right to counsel does not stand on equal footing with
that of citizens or lawfully present noncitizens, may nevertheless
assert their rights indirectly and obliquely.
One might ask how much this inquiry concerns unauthorized
migrants at all, just as one might ask if examining the exclusionary
rule in immigration proceedings addresses the rights of unauthorized
migrants. To be sure, noncitizens who face potential removal from the
United States in immigration proceedings include lawful permanent
residents who may have become deportable for a variety of reasons,
240
such as being convicted of a crime. But many noncitizens in
immigration court proceedings who appear to lack lawful status in the
United States may nevertheless be eligible for discretionary relief
resulting in lawful immigration status, including permanent
241
residence. For these unauthorized migrants, the contours of any
right to effective counsel can make a big difference.
Although the right to effective counsel has great practical
significance for unauthorized migrants, this inquiry differs from
inquiries into state and local laws, workplace protections, and search
and seizure. The difference arises in that the right to effective counsel
depends more directly on the meaning of unlawful presence as a
threshold issue. Part I noted that, in deciding whether subfederal laws
are preempted, courts might consider that even those who clearly lack
lawful immigration status may never be removed from the United

238. INA § 240(b)(4)A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006).
239. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 4 (2007) (explaining problems associated with the fact that a noncitizen “will never
have the right to appointed counsel”); LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring
Competent Representation in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 150–68 (2009)
(discussing problems attributable to the absence of appointed counsel in immigration
proceedings).
240. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
241. See, e.g., INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
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States. This was a key element in the reasoning in both City of
242
243
Hazleton and Plyler. But Part I assumed generally that the
noncitizens affected by the state and local laws under discussion are
unauthorized migrants. Similarly, Part II assumed that the noncitizens
seeking the contested workplace protections are unauthorized
migrants.
The search and seizure cases in Part III are slightly different,
because the core issue of suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment arises in the context of removal
proceedings. In this context, unlike in the context of state and local
law enforcement and workplace protections, the issue of unlawful
immigration status is contested—for that is the very purpose of a
removal proceeding. Part III, however, assumed that the evidence
sought to be suppressed in removal proceedings is probative of
alienage or immigration law status, often by tending to prove
unlawful presence. This assumption frames the question as whether
probative evidence should nonetheless be suppressed because the
government obtained it illegally. In this sense, Part III focused on
unauthorized migrants.
This Part differs from the preceding three Parts in that it is not
clear that noncitizens who assert a right to effective counsel are
unauthorized migrants. For this reason, the right to effective counsel
is not just a right of an unauthorized migrant, but is also a right to
contest that characterization. But the remedies afforded to
unauthorized migrants for ineffective assistance of counsel reflect
patterns of argument closely related to those discussed in Parts I, II,
and III. As a result, examining the right to effective counsel leads to a
more textured understanding of institutional competence and citizen
proxy arguments. Examining the right to counsel thus further
elucidates how the legal system conceptualizes the rights of
unauthorized migrants generally.
A. Defining the Right
In 2009, questions about a right to effective counsel in removal
244
proceedings came to a head in the case of Matter of Compean,

242. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 531–32 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued,
No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008); see also supra Part I.
243. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982); see also supra Part I.
244. In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
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which prompted the rare intervention of two attorneys general of the
245
United States, one of whom reversed his predecessor. The case
grew out of three separate removal proceedings in immigration
246
court. One respondent, Enrique Salas Compean, entered the United
247
States unlawfully in 1989. Fifteen years later, Compean was placed
in a removal proceeding in which he sought cancellation of removal—
a form of case-by-case discretionary relief that can confer lawful
permanent resident status on a noncitizen present in the United
248
States unlawfully. The second respondent, Sylla Bangaly, had been
lawfully admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant but was
249
placed in removal proceedings when he overstayed his admission.
The third respondent was an asylum applicant, known as J-E-C-, who
was admitted to the United States for a six-month period but then
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection based on
250
the Convention Against Torture.
All three respondents were present in the United States
unlawfully, but each claimed some form of relief that could cure the
apparent lack of lawful immigration status and eventually lead to
permanent residence. After receiving an adverse ruling from the
immigration judge in his removal proceeding, each respondent filed a
motion to reopen his case, arguing that his attorney had rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present highly relevant
251
evidence or failing to file an appellate brief. The three immigration
judges denied these motions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals
252
(BIA) affirmed all three.
The immigration judges and the BIA all applied the prevailing
law governing ineffective assistance claims. The regulations on
motions to reopen require the respondent to offer evidence that “is
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or
253
presented at the former hearing.” Ineffective assistance claims can

245. See In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2–3 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (reversing
Attorney General Mukasey’s order in Compean I).
246. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 714–16.
247. Id. at 714–15.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 715.
250. Id. at 715–16.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2009).
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254

satisfy this requirement if they fulfill the procedural requirements
255
set forth in Matter of Lozada, a 1988 decision by the BIA. Lozada
requires any motion to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel to
be supported by documents describing what the prior attorney agreed
to do, how the noncitizen notified the prior attorney of the
allegations, and whether the noncitizen filed a complaint with bar
256
disciplinary authorities (or why not).
Courts vary in their insistence on literal compliance with the
257
procedural requirements established by Lozada. And immigration
judges’ decisions to grant or deny motions to reopen for ineffective
assistance of counsel are heavily fact dependent. But it has become
broadly accepted that ineffective assistance is a valid basis for a
motion to reopen, and the right to effective counsel is a matter not
only of statute and regulation, but also of constitutional due
258
process. Due process is violated, in the phrasing of an oft-quoted
decision, when assistance is “so ineffective as to have impinged upon
259
the fundamental fairness of the hearing.”
This last point about a constitutional basis for a right to effective
counsel might raise eyebrows, given the absence of a constitutional
260
right to any counsel. Coleman v. Thompson, a 1991 U.S. Supreme
Court decision, held that if there is no constitutional right to
appointed counsel in a criminal proceeding, then there is no
261
constitutional basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Did Coleman eliminate any constitutional basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in an immigration proceeding? The
254. See, e.g., Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel satisfy the [regulations’] general requirement[s] . . . .”).
255. In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988).
256. Id. at 637; see also ALEINIKOFF, MARTIN, MOTOMURA & FULLERTON, supra note 2, at
1064–77.
257. Compare Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While the
requirements of Lozada are generally reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their
purpose is fully served by other means.”), and Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that ‘‘only . . . substantial compliance is necessary’’), with Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d
498, 501–04 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding the BIA’s denial of an alien’s motion to reopen on
account of his failure to comply with Lozada).
258. See, e.g., Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the immigration
judge and the BIA had violated an alien’s due process rights by denying his motion to reopen
his asylum proceeding to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
259. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Dakane v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2005) (employing functionally identical language).
260. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
261. Id. at 752–54.
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government raised this argument unsuccessfully in the case of Matter
262
In that case, the BIA reasoned that the Fifth
of Assaad.
Amendment’s Due Process Clause supported a different analysis of
ineffective assistance claims than the Sixth Amendment suggested for
263
criminal proceedings. Assaad focused on the federal courts of
appeals’ consistent recognition that noncitizens have “a Fifth
Amendment due process right to a fair immigration hearing and may
be denied that right if counsel prevents the respondent from
264
meaningfully presenting his or her case.”
Those were the general contours of the doctrine when, in the last
months of the George W. Bush presidency, Attorney General
Michael Mukasey certified the cases involving Compean, Bangaly,
265
and J-E-C- to himself for consolidated review. The BIA found for
the government in all three cases, but Mukasey chose this occasion to,
as he put it, “review the Board’s position on both the constitutional
question and the question of how best to resolve an alien’s claim that
266
his removal proceeding was prejudiced by his lawyer’s errors.” The
result was his decision in Compean I, issued shortly before President
267
Bush left office.
Compean I held that “the Constitution does not confer a
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in removal
268
proceedings.” Noting that several federal appeals courts in the six
years since Assaad had found no constitutional right to effective
269
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings, Compean I overruled

262. In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553 (B.I.A. 2003).
263. Id. at 560 (declining to overrule Lozada in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Coleman).
264. Id. at 558.
265. Under the regulations governing the BIA within the Department of Justice, the
Attorney General may choose to review a BIA decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2008).
266. In re Compean (Compean I), 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 714 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (citing Att’y
Gen. Order Nos. 2990-2008, 2991-2008 & 2992-2008 (Aug. 7, 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i)
(2008)).
267. Attorney General Mukasey handed down his decision on January 7, 2009, less than two
weeks before Barack Obama acceded to the presidency.
268. Id. at 714.
269. Id. at 713. At the time of the Compean I decision, federal appellate courts had reached
divergent outcomes on the matter. Compare Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that no such constitutional right exists), Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798–99
(4th Cir. 2008) (same), and Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (same), with
Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that such claims are
constitutionally cognizable), Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600–01 (2d Cir. 2008) (same), Zeru
v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (same), Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155

MOTOMORA IN FINAL

2010]

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

1779

270

Lozada and Assaad. But Compean I continued: “In extraordinary
cases, where a lawyer’s deficient performance likely changed the
outcome of an alien’s removal proceedings, the Board may reopen
those proceedings notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional
271
right to such relief.” To reach this result, Mukasey’s reasoning went
through three main steps. First, deportation is civil, not criminal, so
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is the source of any
272
constitutional right to counsel. Second, the performance of private
counsel does not constitute “state action,” which is normally required
273
for a due process violation. Third, and most directly addressing the
central issue in the case, the Constitution does not guarantee counsel
at all, so there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of
274
counsel.
In the fifth month of the Obama administration, Attorney
275
General Eric Holder vacated his predecessor’s decision. Referring
to the approach in Lozada and Assaad, Holder reasoned that
Compean I had not “resulted in a thorough consideration of the
issues involved, particularly for a decision that implemented a new,
complex framework in place of a well-established and longstanding
practice that had been reaffirmed by the Board in 2003 after careful
276
consideration.” Holder then ordered the initiation of rulemaking
procedures “to evaluate the Lozada framework and to determine
277
what modifications should be proposed for public consideration.”
Though it is too early to predict the outcome of rulemaking, it is
significant that Attorney General Holder addressed the substance of
the issue by repudiating the statement in Compean I that “there is no
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in removal

(3d Cir. 2007) (same), Sene v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (same), Dakane v.
U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (same), Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192,
1196 (10th Cir. 2003) (same), and Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2006)
(same).
270. Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 712, 727.
271. Id. at 714.
272. Id. at 716–17.
273. Id. at 717–18.
274. See id. at 726 (“[T]here is no valid basis for recognizing a constitutional right to counsel
in removal proceedings, and thus no valid basis for recognizing a constitutional right to effective
assistance of privately retained lawyers in such proceedings.”).
275. In re Compean (Compean II), 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
276. Id.
277. Id.
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278

This statement, Holder emphasized, was “not
proceedings.”
necessary either to decide the[] case under [existing law,] or to initiate
279
a rulemaking process.” More fundamentally, Part IV’s inquiry into
the right to effective assistance of counsel does not depend on the
specifics of any rules that may be adopted. My more basic purpose is
to see how the approach adopted by the BIA and the majority of the
federal courts of appeals that have addressed the topic sheds light on
the rights of unauthorized migrants, especially in ways that add to the
lessons of this Article’s first three Parts.
B. Assumptions, Institutional Competence, and Citizen Proxies
The contrast between the two decisions in Compean I and
Compean II is instructive because Attorney General Mukasey’s
abrogation of the established law governing ineffective assistance of
counsel in immigration proceedings—and Attorney General Holder’s
repudiation of that view and his tentative deference to that set of
precedents—exposes some key assumptions that underlie the law’s
response to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. These
assumptions reflect varying views of the meaning of unlawful
presence in the United States.
If many noncitizens without lawful status are allowed to stay in
the United States through cancellation of removal, waivers of
inadmissibility and deportability, and other forms of case-by-case
discretionary relief, then a noncitizen’s lack of lawful status is just the
beginning of the analysis, not its end. Moreover, the grant or denial of
such discretionary relief is governed by standards, factors, and other
markers suggesting that this has become a question of law, at least in
the sense that deviations from decisions in similar prior cases can
fairly be called erroneous. If, in turn, unauthorized migrants can
acquire lawful immigration status through determinations governed
by legal standards, then the right to effective counsel seems essential
to outcomes that are fair and just. This is true even if the decision in
any given case eventually goes against the unauthorized migrant who
seeks discretionary relief.
This interpretation of unlawful presence is also the basis for
questioning the threshold characterization of deportation as civil, not
criminal. For if there are discernable, enforceable standards that

278. Id.
279. Id.
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govern the discretionary relief that can effectively legalize
unauthorized migrants on a case-by-case basis, removing them from
their homes in the United States seems that much closer to
punishment. As James Madison once put it, “if a banishment of this
sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it
will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be
280
applied.” This view of removal is bolstered by the growing practice
of detaining noncitizens placed in removal proceedings, and by court
decisions recognizing that detention gives rise to rights beyond those
281
that attach in removal proceedings.
What happens if the opposite assumptions prevail? What if
unlawful presence is clear and dispositive, in that it dictates the
ultimate result of the removal proceeding by inevitably forcing the
noncitizen to leave the United States? And even if ultimate removal
is not inevitable, what if discretionary relief is an act of grace that is
not susceptible to correction after comparing the facts, reasoning, and
outcome with prior cases? If either assumption is correct, then any
right to effective assistance of counsel is not only less urgent but also
less grounded in constitutional due process. Moreover, an attorney’s
persistence seems dilatory rather than a worthy claim of right.
Contrasting these sets of assumptions reveals some connections
between the indirect assertion of rights by unauthorized migrants and
the direct assertion of the right to effective counsel in immigration
proceedings—at least as it appears in Lozada, Assaad, Compean II,
and a number of federal appeals court decisions. Importantly, this
comparison demonstrates that the right to effective assistance of
counsel can be understood as an institutional competence argument.
If motions to reopen for ineffective assistance of counsel are
rarely or never granted, then the initial decisions to arrest
unauthorized migrants and put them into removal proceedings are
likely to be the only decisions that matter after Congress sets up the
basic categories for admission and removal. If, however, immigration
judges are required to be receptive to ineffective assistance claims so
that attorneys can bring supportable arguments for discretionary
relief in spite of their apparently unlawful status, then ultimate

280. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
281. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (highlighting the “serious
constitutional problem arising out of a statute that . . . permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent,
deprivation of human liberty”).
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decisionmaking power will shift away from front-line enforcement
officers. Put differently, recognizing a right to effective counsel makes
more meaningful the possibility that initial enforcement decisions will
be tempered by what happens in immigration court.
This is a choice between two views of what constitutes
institutional competence not only in deciding who must leave the
United States, but even more fundamentally, in deciding what
unlawful presence means. So viewed, this resembles the contrasting
approaches to preemption seen in the cases challenging state and
282
local laws. City of Hazleton is deeply skeptical of enforcement
decisions by state and local officials in ways that parallel the deep
skepticism of initial determinations of unlawful presence in the right
283
to effective counsel cases.
The right to effective counsel can also be understood as a citizen
proxy argument. Ineffective counsel jeopardizes the interests of the
U.S. citizens and permanent residents who are close family members
of the unauthorized migrants whom the government has put into
removal proceedings. These close relatives are typically the
individuals whose hardship must be taken into account as part of the
decision on discretionary relief. For potentially viable claims of
unauthorized migrants to be cut off without being presented with the
assistance of competent counsel is to harm these citizens and
permanent residents. This is the same indirect assertion of
unauthorized migrants’ rights shown to be effective in the workplace
protection and search and seizure contexts.
CONCLUSION: TWILIGHT AMERICANS?
What emerges from these inquiries into four areas in which the
rights of unauthorized migrants are contested? Why does any of this
matter? To answer these questions, I start by drawing one obvious
conclusion from this Article’s four inquiries. In spite of their position
outside the law, unauthorized migrants do have rights in some
significant respects. They can claim partial or indirect rights in four
important areas in which the ability to claim rights can matter a great
deal. Unauthorized migrants are integrated into the U.S. legal system,
but often their rights can be asserted only obliquely or indirectly.

282. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), argued, No. 07-3531
(3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2008); see also supra Part I.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
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The four topics reveal five recurring and intertwined patterns.
Some rights can be vindicated only if unauthorized migrants can
either (1) question a government decisionmaker’s institutional
competence, (2) identify wrongdoers who are more culpable than the
unauthorized migrants, (3) identify citizen proxies, (4) invoke
procedural surrogates, or (5) invoke phantom norms. These five
patterns are not necessarily widespread, but they have emerged
enough to suggest reasoning and modes of argument that may
persuade many judges in many cases, especially if pressed by
advocates on facts that a particular judge finds sympathetic.
Second, these patterns of indirect or oblique rights are consistent
with a national ambivalence toward immigration outside the law.
Much of Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Plyler was directed toward
complicating the meaning of unlawful presence. According to his
view, illegality is difficult to establish, and even noncitizens lacking an
avenue to lawful status might never be removed from the United
States. By definition, unauthorized migrants are in the United States
in violation of the law, and yet immigration law enforcement in the
United States—as it was when Brennan wrote one generation ago—
still reflects widespread tolerance of immigration outside the law.
This is the knowing and perhaps intentional consequence of
government policy. In this setting, the U.S. legal system recognizes
that unauthorized migrants cannot be relegated to true oblivion.
During oral argument in Plyler, Justice Thurgood Marshall asked
the attorney for the state of Texas, John Hardy, whether Texas could
284
deny fire protection to illegal aliens. Apparently nonplussed, Hardy
bought a little time: “Deny them fire protection?” Marshall persisted:
“Yes, sir. F-I-R-E. . . . Could Texas pass a law and say they cannot be
protected?” When Hardy said that he didn’t think it could, Marshall
pressed on: “Why not? . . . Somebody’s house is more important than
285
his child?”
National ambivalence toward immigration outside the law poses
some hard choices about legal protections for unauthorized migrants.
What is like fire protection and what is not? Just as national policy

284. See Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal Protection: The Texas Cases that Opened the
Schoolhouse Door to Undocumented Immigrant Children, TEX. OBSERVER, July 12, 2007,
http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=2548; see also Transcript of Oral Argument,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-1538), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/19801989/1981/1981_80_1538/argument.
285. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 284.
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allows unauthorized migrants to live and work in the United States,
the legal system sometimes affords them remedies for maltreatment
by state and local governments, for employer wrongdoing, for illegal
law enforcement activity, and for ineffective representation in
immigration court. And yet, in the same way that unauthorized
migrants live under the threat of discretionary government decisions
that could lead to their deportation, the legal system circumscribes
and channels their legal rights claims. Does de facto national policy
on immigration outside the law cause these patterns of oblique or
conditional rights? It is hard to build a convincing case for causation.
But it is safe to say that these patterns are generally consistent with
U.S. immigration policy.
Third, these patterns of oblique rights are related to each other.
A major purpose of this Article has been to map these connections
for the first time. For example, the trend toward institutional
competence and away from individual rights claims is consistent with
the emergence of interest surrogates in the form of citizen proxy
arguments in the workplace law context. Both citizen proxy
arguments and institutional competence arguments reflect greater
reliance on process, especially on transparency and on the dialogue
that transparency may enable or foster. This may mean a shift of
advocacy and responsibility from court litigation to the political
branches. It may also initiate a shift in the debate from state and local
governments to the federal government.
Fourth, these patterns suggest relationships—both doctrinal and
strategic—between various types of arguments to challenge
government decisionmaking. The relationships suggested by these
patterns shift significantly away from the relationships that prevail
when citizens challenge the government. Unauthorized migrants are
vulnerable to racial or ethnic discrimination masked by laws that are
facially neutral as to race or ethnicity, yet may have been enacted by a
city council that was quite aware that to target noncitizens based on
immigration law status—which the U.S. Constitution allows outside
of public K–12 education—would be to target a population that is
racially or ethnically different. The challenge that is most likely to
invalidate such a local decision is not equal protection, but
preemption.
In addition to shifts in doctrinal relationships that concern race
and ethnicity, the patterns discussed in this Article suggest that
similar shifts in other aspects of doctrine are putting advocates and
decisionmakers to complex choices. In the workplace context, for
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example, the key to litigation success is identifying wrongdoers who
are more culpable than the unauthorized worker or U.S. citizens who
will be harmed if the unauthorized worker wins an inadequate
remedy. But this shift diverts attention away from the factors that
might help decide whether unauthorized migrants deserve more
direct recognition of their individual rights, without the workarounds
that have become part of judicial decisions and litigation strategies.
These patterns of oblique rights shift debate away from the moral
argument for and against recognition of unauthorized migrants as
individuals and as a group of unauthorized migrants. Instead, debate
shifts toward viewing the unauthorized simply through the pragmatic
prism of asking: How will what happens to “them” affect “us”? But it
should not be surprising that this is precisely how the role of
unauthorized migrants in U.S. society—though the formal law would
deny their presence—reemerges as legal argument.
A final thought comes back to this Article’s central thesis—that
the rights of unauthorized migrants have evolved in certain patterns
that reflect various aspects of a pervasive national ambivalence about
immigration outside the law. The current impasse—not only with
regard to what to do about immigration outside the law, but also with
regard to how to even think about it—has many costs. Chief among
these costs are serious impediments to addressing major challenges
and opportunities that come with being a nation of immigrants. These
challenges and opportunities include three foundational questions
286
that I have addressed elsewhere. I mention them here as a frame for
learning from this Article’s inquiry into the rights of these others.
One question is how to define immigration enforcement to
reflect the sensitive exercise of discretion and to recognize that the
line between legal and illegal immigration is not—and has never
been—clear and impermeable. The second question is how to foster
the growth of communities that can meaningfully integrate both
citizens and noncitizens, including some unauthorized migrants. The
third question is how to honor any obligations and expectations that
emerge from the complex historical origins of immigration outside
the law, and yet to also move forward in the national interest.
Answering these questions is essential if national policy is to
achieve a measure of justice in immigration, where this aspiration is
especially elusive because the very idea of citizenship presupposes

286. See Motomura, supra note 2.

MOTOMURA IN FINAL

1786

3/30/2010 6:17:43 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1723

some inequality between citizens and noncitizens. There are many
obstacles that stand between the status quo and a just immigration
policy. One major obstacle is the reality that unauthorized migrants
are twilight Americans, with the indirect and oblique rights that this
Article has analyzed. At the same time, as long as impasse persists in
public debate about immigration outside the law, these patterns of
oblique rights may be the inevitable consequence.

